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ABSTRACT
This study examines the changing relationship between parliament and the 
Crown during the Tudor monarchies. When Henry VIII broke from the Roman 
Catholic church in 1533, he created a contradiction in the theory of Tudor monarchy; 
he gained the authority of an imperial king at the price of dependence on parliament. 
Though he regarded parliament as a tool to facilitate his imperial quests for territorial 
autonomy and a male heir, Henry’s expedient inclusion of parliament in state matters 
proved problematic for his children.
Unwilling to accept what they considered the imprudent decisions of a minor 
and two female monarchs, the men of parliament increased their interference in the 
royal succession during the reigns of the later Tudors. By analyzing John Aylmer’s 
1558 treatise, An Harborowefor Faithfull and Trewe Subjects, and Elizabethan 
parliamentary records, among other contemporary sources, I contend that the 
escalating conflict between parliament and the Crown was not inevitable or 
conspiratorial but rather a response to circumstances by men bound to counsel their 
female sovereign.
PARLIAMENT AND THE 
TUDOR SUCCESSION CRISIS
INTRODUCTION
In 1533, Henry VIII divorced Catherine o f Aragon, who had failed to produce 
a male heir, and married Anne Boleyn. In order to secure this divorce, which was 
prohibited by canon law, and remarry, Henry declared his independence from Rome; 
he claimed that his realm was an empire and as such, subject to no higher jurisdiction 
than the King himself. To Henry’s disappointment, his second wife also bore only a 
female child. In his quest for a male heir, Henry divorced and remarried several more 
times, passed four separate succession acts, and wrote a last will and testament that 
alternately bastardized his daughters and placed them in line for the throne. In 1547 
Edward VI, Henry’s long-hoped-for son, became the king of England as a minor. On 
his deathbed several years later, he and his Protestant counselors conspired to place a 
Protestant heir on the throne in place of his Catholic sister Mary; despite these 
machinations, Mary inherited the throne in 1553. In order to ensure that England 
would remain Catholic, Mary married Philip o f Spain, hoping to produce an heir who 
would prevent the accession of the Protestant princess Elizabeth. During her short 
reign, Mary experienced only a false pregnancy, and Elizabeth became queen in 1558. 
Against all expectations, Elizabeth obdurately refused to marry or otherwise settle the 
succession, effectively reversing her father’s desperate policy to provide a male heir.
2
3These events, in brief, comprise the Tudor succession crisis. Religion, a royal 
minority, and considerations of gender clearly complicated this series of crises, as did 
the legislative participation of the men who sat in parliament. What role did 
parliament play in these events, and more importantly, how did the succession crisis 
change the relationship between parliament and the crown? In this paper, I will 
endeavor to answer these questions, paying particular attention to Henry VIII’s 
legislative revolution and the early years of Elizabeth I’s queenship. These same 
questions have perennially occupied Tudor political scholars, creating a lengthy and 
often contentious historiographical debate that I will outline as a point o f departure for 
my own analysis.
In 1953, in his Elizabeth I  and Her Parliaments, J. E. Neale proposed a 
decidedly Whiggish version of Tudor-Stuart parliamentary history. Working 
backward from the research of his colleague, Wallace Notestein, Neale sought to find 
the catalyst for parliament’s bold “initiative” during the reigns of the Stuart kings.1 
Beginning with the reign of Henry VIII, according to Neale, parliament steadily and 
inevitably progressed to the predominant status it achieved under the Stuarts. Most 
significant was Neale’s argument that, like their Stuart successors, Tudor parliaments 
gained influence through calculated opposition in the House of Commons. Neale 
contended that, by taking advantage of its expanded legislative role in Henry’s 
divorce proceedings, “parliament arrogated to itself the functions of a court... on its 
own initiative.”2 In regard to Mary’s reign, Neale recognized the influence of gender
1 Norman Jones, “Parliament and the Governance of Elizabethan England: A Review,” Albion 19 (Fall 
1987): 327.
2 J. E. Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments. 1559-1581 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953), 17, 19.
4on interactions between the men in parliament and their female sovereign. Mary’s 
female status unleashed what he called “the critical, combative instincts of sixteenth- 
century mankind,” making Mary’s brief reign an “apprenticeship for [parliament’s] 
future greatness.”3
Though Henry’s divorce and Mary’s gender had opened the door for 
parliamentary ascendance, Neale found the greatest evidence of Stuart-type conflict 
during Elizabeth’s reign. Reading between the lines of parliamentary proceedings, 
Neale postulated the existence of a forty-three-man Puritan ‘choir’ in the Commons 
who, through “concerted preparation,” sought to further their own agenda at the 
expense of the queen.4 He identified this group on the basis of a pamphlet entitled “A 
Lewd Pasquil Set Forth by Certain of the Parliament Men.” This group of religiously- 
driven men, he said, “were set on coercing their Sovereign.”5 Neale perceived this 
resistance primarily in terms of religion, but he considered conflict over the 
succession an additional indication of parliament’s long-term conspiracy to wrest 
sovereignty from the monarch.
Neale also suggested that parliament’s persistent refusal to accept Elizabeth’s 
succession policies was related to her gender, a point not missed by Elizabeth herself. 
In his words, “Elizabeth was right: they would not have dared to treat her father so. 
The regiment of a woman displayed its inherent weakness.”6 Neale argued that 
Elizabeth’s rejection of parliament’s counsel encouraged the men of parliament to 
increase their opposition from what it had been under her father’s reign, thus
3 Ibid., 21.
4 Ibid., 421.
5 Ibid., 134.
5hastening the “evolution” of an independent parliament.7 This evolution was 
epitomized by Peter Wentworth, who accused the queen of abrogating parliament’s 
right to free speech through her command that the men of parliament cease discussion 
on her succession. Neale categorized Wentworth’s actions as the “dawn of a new age; 
harbinger of Stuart conflicts.”8
In response to Neale’s thesis, G. R. Elton blatantly asserted that “all the talk of 
the rise of Parliament as an institution into political prominence is balderdash.”9 
After undermining Neale’s presumptive evidence in support of a self-serving Puritan 
choir, and chastising him for anachronistically explaining Tudor politics in terms of 
Stuart conflict, Elton contended that Tudor parliaments were in fact apolitical 
institutions. That is, parliament was called by the monarch to pass legislation, an 
activity that occupied the vast majority of its time in comparison to the brief 
discussions of political issues that Neale emphasized.10 Furthermore, far from being 
an independent counterbalance to monarchy, parliament was wholly dependent on the 
Crown for its very existence. In Elton’s words, if parliament “did stop a powerful 
executive from becoming an absolutist monarchy, it did so not by forming a 
counterpoise to the Crown but by assisting the Crown in lawful government.”11 
Despite their fundamental disagreement on the evolution and business of 
parliament, Elton and Neale agreed that parliament had experienced a revolution
6 Ibid., 142.
7 Ibid., 421.
8 Ibid., 152.
9 G. R. Elton, The Parliament of England. 1559-1581 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
378.
10 G. R. Elton, “Parliament in the Sixteenth Century: Functions and Fortunes,” The Historical Journal 
22 (1979): 258.
6during Henry’s reign. To Elton’s mind, the Henrician revolution of the 1530s did not 
portend parliament’s rise to autonomy but rather signaled the extension of 
parliament’s legislative purview into spiritual as well as temporal matters. In this 
sense, argued Elton, the Henrician Reformation could be considered a milestone in 
the history of law; for all Henry’s claims concerning the divine origin of his supreme 
headship, his religious reformation was carried about by parliamentary statute, not the 
law of God. The common law, created by the joint body of the king-in-parliament 
through statute, therefore triumphed over its long-time rival, canon law.12 In 
comparison to Neale’s oppositional framework, Elton thus emphasized the 
cooperation between king and parliament in constructing the statutory basis of the 
Reformation, an event that augmented both of their statures.
Crucially, Elton perceived no change between the Henrician and Elizabethan 
parliaments, apparently ignoring or discrediting Neale’s suggestion that the gender of 
the monarch influenced the relationship between parliament and the Crown.
According to Elton, “no significant development occurred to take either the whole 
body or the Commons further along the road to new initiatives or a new 
independence... further, that is, from the position attained in [Henry’s] Reformation 
Parliament.”13 Though he refused to recognize any shift in parliament’s role between 
the two reigns, Elton could not avoid the evidence of political conflict during 
Elizabeth’s early queenship. He explained this phenomenon not in terms of
11 Elton, Parliament of England. 378. Quoted by Dale Hoak in his review of Elton’s book in the 
American Historical Review (June 1988), 686.
12 G. R. Elton, “Lex Terrae Victrix: The Triumph of Parliamentary Law in the Sixteenth Century,” in 
The Parliaments o f Elizabethan England, eds. D. M. Dean and N. L. Jones (Oxford, 1990), 16, 29.
13 Elton, “Fortunes,” 277.
7parliament’s evolution but rather as the result of parliamentary management by 
factions of the privy council. When their own admonitions to the queen regarding her 
marriage and the succession proved unsuccessful, Elton suggested that the “Privy 
Council used the Parliament to augment their pressure on her.”14 Far from exercising 
their independent authority, Elton therefore argued that the members of parliament 
were little more than sometime mouthpieces of more significant advisors.
Elton’s emphasis on cooperation between monarch and parliament, marred 
only by the scheming of privy councilors, had been widely adopted by the 1980s and 
replaced Neale’s conflict thesis. In 1985, Michael Graves described Elizabeth’s 
parliaments as “not political, seeking to limit or obstruct the crown, but rather co­
operative ventures in legislation,” while Jennifer Loach asserted that conflict between 
Mary and her parliaments was only infrequent, for consensus politics characterized 
that reign.15 Though Neale’s portrayed Mary’s tenure as a crucible of organized 
resistance, Loach concluded that “what seems at first glance to be formed opposition 
turns on closer scrutiny into an ephemeral and largely coincidental association.”16 
Since the 1980s, however, Elton’s cooperative account of parliament and 
Tudor monarchs has lost its hegemonic hold on the historiography. Though his 
argument for harmony between Crown and parliament during Henry’s monarchy 
remains viable, some revisionists have found his assertion untenable for Elizabeth’s
14 Elton, Parliament of England. 374. As explained by Jones, Elton considered parliament a secondary 
arena for the discussion of politics, employed by the queen’s councilors when the normal channels of 
political debate, the court and council, were “clogged.” See “Parliament and the Governance of 
Elizabethan England,” 333-334.
15 Michael A. R. Graves, The Tudor Parliaments. Crown. Lords and Commons. 1485-1603 (London: 
Longman, 1985), 127.
16 Jennifer Loach, Parliament and the Crown in the Reign of Mary Tudor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986,) 201.
8early reign. These scholars have begun to challenge what they see as the artificial 
dichotomy represented by Neale’s usurping parliament and Elton’s apolitical 
institution. As explained by T. E. Hartley, it is possible to identify political conflict 
between queen and parliament without embracing Neale’s notion of oppositional 
ascendance or Elton’s dependence on factional intrigue.17
Conflict and resistance, according to Maria-Victoria de la Torre and Stephen 
Alford, were widespread among the members of parliament during the first decade of 
Elizabeth’s reign. As argued by de la Torre, male MPs considered their succession 
policies superior to Elizabeth’s stalling tactics because she was a woman and 
therefore less capable of ruling than a man. In de la Torre’s scholarship, Neale’s 
contention that gender influenced Mary’s and Elizabeth’s relationships with their 
parliaments has enjoyed a resurgence. De la Torre examines the gender assumptions 
of Elizabethan culture and suggests that Elizabeth’s female sex motivated her MPs to 
mitigate and influence her sovereignty in ways that were inappropriate when a male 
occupied the throne. Because she was a woman, male MPs believed that she
1 ft“required the intervention of men to help make the proper choices.” Though her 
parliaments may have preferred to cooperate with their queen as they had with her 
father, Elizabeth’s refusal to fulfill her dual duties as woman and monarch and secure 
the succession motivated parliament to increase their opposition to her policies.19 As 
explained by de la Torre, “while not self-consciously attempting to usurp power from
17 T. E. Hartley, Elizabeth’s Parliaments: Queen. Lords, and Commons. 1559-1601 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992), 2, 7.
18 Victoria-Maria de la Torre, “Sex, Subjugation, and the Succession: Gender and Politics in Early 
Elizabethan England” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1997), 209.
19 Ibid., 434, 444.
9the Crown and alter the political structure, MPs were responding to circumstances,... 
but in doing so, the manner of their involvement suggests a greater level of 
interference with the Crown, now worn by a woman.”20
For de la Torre, the relationship between Crown and parliament was 
profoundly changed by Elizabeth’s gender. Though parliament had taken part in 
Henry’s succession policies by turning his will into law, its participation under 
Elizabeth was no longer of the rubber-stamp variety.21 Through succession tracts and 
parliamentary petitions, the men of parliament actively resisted and attempted to 
influence the policies of their queen. Elizabeth’s womanhood and her refusal to 
accept the counsel of her male MPs thus undermined the cooperative enhancement of 
power that had characterized the interactions between Henry and his parliaments. 
Henry’s dependence on parliament’s legislative authority to buttress his imperial 
sovereignty, his “marriage of convenience” as Neale termed it, became quite 
inconvenient for his younger daughter. As queen instead of king, she did not receive 
the loyal obedience of her MPs but rather their loyal advice, advice that she was 
expected to heed.
According to Alford, those MPs who proffered their guidance were not 
puppets or independent-minded revolutionaries, but men bound to counsel their 
apparently wayward female monarch. Alford asserts that the men of parliament and 
the privy council shared the same outlook on the queen’s marriage and the
20 Ibid., 262-3.
21 Ibid., 242.
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22succession. MPs needed no prompting to proclaim their opinion that the queen was 
endangering the safety of the realm by remaining unwed and leaving the succession 
unsettled. Far from being controlled by privy councilors, the men who sat in the 1566 
parliament acted against the advice of principal secretary Cecil when they brazenly 
introduced a bill to determine the succession without the queen’s blessing.23
Alford suggests that the MPs’ actions were motivated by expectations based 
on gender, a previous minority, and the rhetoric of counsel. In his words, “the impact 
on the English polity of two female monarchs, and the experience of governing the 
kingdom during the reign of a minor... were reinforced by a literature of European 
conciliarism.”24 This discourse of counsel sprang from a humanist-classical model 
that emphasized the duty of an active citizen to participate in his republic.25 
Elizabethan conciliarists, led by William Cecil, redefined themselves as subjects who 
were bound to advise their sovereign. Though he “accepted the culture of Tudor 
imperialism,” Cecil perceived England as a mixed polity instead of a simple 
monarchy. That is, “he believed that the queen’s imperium was limited by the advice 
of her councilors in [the privy] council and in parliament.”26 When the men of 
parliament encouraged the queen to marry and secure the succession, they were
22 Stephen Alford, The Early Elizabethan Politic: William Cecil and the British Succession Crisis, 
1558-1569 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 98.
23 Norman Jones, The Birth of the Elizabethan Age (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 146.
24 Alford, 210. Though he does express their interdependence very clearly in this statement, Alford 
does not thoroughly explore the interaction between gender and the rhetoric of counsel in the early 
Elizabethan polity.
25 For a full discussion of the humanist-classical roots and expressions of the discourse of counsel see 
John Guy, “The Henrician Age” in The Varieties of British Political Thought. 1500-1800. ed. J. G. A. 
Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).; John Guy, “The Rhetoric of Counsel in Early 
Modem England,” in Tudor Political Culture, ed. Dale Hoak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995).
26 Alford, 7, 210.
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carrying out their conciliar duties. But, Elizabeth’s consistent rebuffs frustrated these 
men who followed the credo of counsel stipulating “action not based on knowledge 
was worthless and knowledge wasted without resulting action.”27
Alford argues that Elizabeth’s treatment of the succession as a private matter 
of her imperium and her corresponding refusal to act on her counselors’ advice 
compelled Cecil and parliament to consider other alternatives to stabilize the 
succession. The most radical o f these alternatives was contained in a clause drafted 
by Cecil in 1563 but never introduced to the queen. Cecil contended that through 
statute, parliament could invest the power to choose the next monarch in a royal 
council if  the queen should die without issue. In effect, this clause would separate 
royal imperium from the person of the monarch. To conciliarists like Cecil, the duty 
to preserve the polity superseded the dictates of the queen herself.28
Alford interprets Cecil’s proposal for a “counciliar interregnum” as evidence 
o f republican thinking in a monarchical context.29 But, like de la Torre, he does not 
perceive a long-term conspiracy among MPs and privy councilors to wrest 
sovereignty from their monarch. Instead, they merely responded to the immediate 
threat of Elizabeth’s succession policies which, they believed, endangered the safety 
of the English nation. To Alford, the succession was the determinant issue in the 
relationship between Elizabeth and her councilors during her early reign, a 
relationship characterized by political conflict rather than Henrician harmony. In his 
words, “Elizabeth’s refusal even to allow the Lords and Commons to debate the
27 Ibid., 33.
28 Ibid., 116.
29 Ibid., 117.
12
future of the kingdom encouraged MPs and councilors to consider alternatives, to 
plan independent action, and to disobey the queen.”30
De la Torre’s 1997 doctoral dissertation and Alford’s book, published in 1998, 
represent some of the freshest insights on parliament’s role in the early Elizabethan 
succession crisis. In this paper, I join them in the project of releasing Elizabeth’s 
parliaments from Elton’s apolitical muzzle. To their persuasive arguments that 
gender and conciliarism underpinned the conflict between queen and parliament, I 
wish to add the precedential factor of Henry VIII’s dependence on parliament for his 
divorce and succession legislation. The break from Rome established Tudor imperial 
kingship, but the legislative component of the revolution was carried out by the 
authority of the king-in-parliament, not the king alone. Therefore, as John Guy 
asserts, the Henrician revolution created a “binary opposition” between imperium and 
consilium in the theory of Tudor monarchy, the same opposition that Alford detects in 
Elizabeth’s reign.31 In the first chapter of this paper, I will explore the competing 
discourses of imperial kingship and mixed sovereignty, as expressed in Henry’s 
search for imperial precedents and Christopher St. German’s notion of the king-in- 
parliament.
Despite the apparent opposition of these two theories, I believe that Elton is 
correct in his assessment that Henrician relations between crown and parliament were 
characterized by cooperation and mutual gain. This was the case primarily because 
the men of parliament transformed Henry’s will into law without resistance. They
30 Ibid., 157.
31 John. Guy, “Tudor Monarchy and its Critiques,” in The Tudor Monarchy, ed. John Guy (London: 
Arnold, 1997), 88-89; John Guy, Tudor England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 133.
13
assented to his multiple and often contradictory succession settlements, even granting 
him the authority to alter hereditary descent through his last will and testament.
Henry required the legitimacy of statute, which only parliament could offer, to carry 
out his Reformation and succession policies and thus had no choice but to extend 
parliament’s legislative purview into spiritual and royal matters.32 Therefore, 
parliament had much to gain by endorsing Henry’s policies. In the first chapter, I will 
discuss Henry’s inclusion of parliament in determining the succession, his vacillation 
on the line of succession, and the limiting effect of these decisions on the imperial 
kinship of his heirs.
As Henry’s children quickly discovered, once MPs had played a role in the 
succession, it proved difficult to prevent them from discussing the issue. Less willing 
to trust the judgment of minor and female monarchs, the men of parliament were no 
longer content to give their uncritical assent but sought to directly influence royal 
marriage and the succession. In the third chapter, I will discuss how minority and 
gender thus brought to the fore the tension between imperium and consilium that had 
remained dormant since the Henrician revolution. To demonstrate this tension in the 
minds of Tudor political theorists, I will analyze John Aylmer’s treatise, An 
Harbor owe fo r Faithful I and Trewe Subjects, written just prior to Elizabeth’s 
accession. Like his Henrician predecessors, Aylmer argued that England was a mixed 
polity, governed by the authority of the queen-in-parliament. In addition, he 
introduced a second legal fiction to describe the relationship between the monarch 
and the state: the queen’s two bodies. By separating Elizabeth’s fallible body natural
32 Elton, “Lex Terrae V ic tr ix 23.
14
from her infallible body politic, it was possible for her counsellorsors to express 
resistance to her allegedly inferior policies. This theory had significant gender 
implications, as Elizabeth herself employed it to describe her superior body politic as 
masculine in nature.
By applying the logic of conciliarism and separating the queen’s two bodies, 
some of Elizabeth’s male counselors even went so far as to suggest that parliament 
could determine the succession without the queen herself. Regarding this issue, I will 
consider William Cecil’s abortive clause for an interregnum council to determine the 
succession, John Hales’ 1563 tract encouraging his fellow parliamentarians to act in 
the best interests of their country which, in this case, was against the queen, and 
parliament’s attempt in 1566 to initiate succession legislation without the queen’s 
approval. Though they all proved unsuccessful, in my opinion, these radical, 
unprecedented proposals constitute definitive evidence that the relationship between 
parliament and the Crown had changed from Henry’s to Elizabeth’s reign. Why 
indeed had parliament, in a period of thirty years, gone from playing no role in the 
royal succession, to giving its consent through legislation, to resisting the queen’s 
policies, and ultimately proposing to act independently of the queen? The answer, I 
believe, is related to both Henry’s and Elizabeth’s succession policies. Henry’s 
expedient inclusion of the men of parliament in his religious and succession 
legislation set the stage for their greater interference in state matters during the reigns 
of his children. Elizabeth’s gender in general and her stubborn refusal to heed 
counsel on the succession in particular, catalyzed the change.
CHAPTER ONE 
Henry VIII: Building An Empire of Interdependence
King Henry VIII is perhaps best known for the personal and often selfish 
power he wielded over his subjects. He carried out numerous and costly wars in an 
effort to implement his imperialist claims, married and divorced wives as suited his 
purposes, had himself declared a caesaropapist in the Act of Supremacy (1534), 
thereby placing himself rather than the Pope at the head of the English church, and 
established England as an empire with himself as emperor in the tradition of 
Constantine. Yet, “the most willful king ever to sit on the throne of England” also 
compromised his absolute sovereignty by making parliament an essential and 
permanent part of the English government.33 Because the English Reformation that 
made him imperial sovereign was carried out by means o f statute, Henry was 
inherently dependent on parliament. This dependence led to a concurrent, mutual 
expansion of the authority of both king and parliament. As Henry extended his royal 
supremacy to encompass religious as well as temporal matters, parliament 
simultaneously gained omnicompetence, in the sense that it could legislate for both 
church and state alike.
33 G. R. Elton, “The Body of the Whole Realm: Parliament and Representation in Medieval and Tudor 
England,” publication of Jamestown Essays on Representation, ed. A. E. Dick Howard (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1969), 19; G. R. Elton, The Tudor Constitution. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 234.
15
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The relationship between these two governing bodies was not one of 
competition for individual power, but rather cooperation for mutual benefit. The king 
required the legal force of parliamentary statute to achieve his Reformation while 
parliament depended upon Henry’s supreme headship of the Church of England to 
extend its legislative purview into spiritual issues. In order to carry out this dual 
revolution, the previously distinct governing bodies of king and parliament became 
the indivisible king-in-parliament. As Michael Graves succinctly asserts “it only 
required the crisis of the 1530s to transform this trinity into a mixed sovereign which 
could deal, without restraint, in all aspects of human affairs.”34
There is no doubt that the events o f the 1530s represent a crucial turning point 
in the history of parliament.35 However, the perceived significance of the 
Reformation renders historians particularly prone to the mythologies of doctrine and 
coherence as described by Quentin Skinner. Most relevant to Tudor-Stuart history, 
Skinner warns against studying history with preconceived expectations based on 
future events and shaping the potentially disparate actions of an individual or 
government into a coherent, conscious plan. Skinner’s “mythologies” have been 
enacted by some Tudor historians, such as Neale, who have read the relationship 
between Henry VIII and his parliament in terms of a struggle between tyranny, 
embodied in the former, and freedom, championed by the latter. Echoing Skinner, G. 
R. Elton noted that because of the pervasiveness of this seventeenth-century “Whig” 
paradigm, “parliament’s performance has been judged by the degree to which it
34 Graves, 58.
17
approximated the ideal stereotype of a counterbalance.”36 As this chapter will attempt 
to demonstrate, this conclusion is anachronistic for Henry’s reign, when king and 
parliament cooperatively exercised their mixed sovereignty as the king-in-parliament.
A second mythology in Tudor historiography treats Henry’s actions prior to 
the Reformation as deliberate precursors to his policies in the 1530s. Basing his 
conclusions on Henry’s insertion of imperial ideas into his coronation promises, 
Walter Ullman asserts that “the Act in Restraint of Appeals merely spells out in detail 
what had been in Henry’s mind some twenty-four years earlier.”37 Though they are 
less sweeping than Ullman, confining their conclusions to the years 1527-1533, 
Graham Nicolson refers to Henry’s “consistent direction” and Virginia Murphy 
characterizes Henry’s actions as a “coherent policy.”38 Historians such as John Guy, 
Dale Hoak, and Thomas Mayer have avoided this mythology of coherence by pointing 
out possible paralles but cautioning that Henry’s policies before the Reformation are 
“too often read in anticipation of the Act of Appeals.”39 As Mayer succinctly states,
35 Elton, “Body of the Whole Realm,” 46. A true believer in the momentous role of the decade, Elton 
states, “In the history of Parliament, as in so much else, the 1530s reset the stage upon which the 
fortunes of England were playing themselves out.”
36 Ibid., 16; Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and 
Theory 7 (1969): 11. In Skinner’s words, “the tendency to search for approximations to the ideal type 
yields a form of non-history which is almost entirely given over to pointing out earlier ‘anticipations’ of 
later doctrines....”
37 Walter Ullman, “‘This Realm of England is An Empire,”’ Journal of Ecclesiastical History 30 
(1979): 184.
38 Graham Nicolson, “The Act of Appeals and the English Reformation,” in Law and Government 
Under the Tudors, eds. Claire Cross, David Loades, and J. J. Scarisbrick (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 19; Virginia Murphy, “The Literature and Propaganda of Henry VIII’s First 
Divorce,” in The Reign of Henry VIII: Politics. Policy, and Piety, ed. Darmaid MacCulloch (New 
York, 1995), 136.
39 Dale Hoak, “The Iconography of the Crown Imperial,” in Tudor Political Culture, ed. Dale Hoak 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 101.
18
“we know where Henry and the others were going, but he could not have, at least to 
the same degree.”40
1. Imperial Kingship 
With these caveats in mind, it is imperative to explore the intellectual 
background of the Act in Restraint of Appeals of 1533. We know from Graham 
Nicolson’s discovery of the Collecteana Satis Copiosa that Thomas Cromwell did not 
create the pregnant concept “this realm of England is an empire” at the time that he 
composed the Act. Though Henry and Cromwell certainly used the assorted historical 
precedents contained in the Collecteana as the foundation for Henry’s imperial 
kingship, the Collecteana itself was compiled by Henry’s intellectual coterie.
Nicolson locates the unmistakable connection between the Collecteana and the Act of 
Appeals in the numerous drafts of the Act.41 In the Act itself, the contents of the 
Collecteana underlie the opening phrase, “by divers sundry old authentic histories and 
chronicles.”42 Therefore, based on Henry’s own obsession with precedent and the 
manifest impact that it had on his policy, an investigation of the precedents that 
formed his idea of empire is in order 43
40 Thomas F. Mayer, “On the Road to 1534: the Occupation of Toumai and Henry VIII’s Theory of 
Sovereignty,” in Tudor Political Culture, ed. Dale Hoak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 30.
41 Nicolson, 23; Guy, Tudor England. 133. Guy shares Nicolson’s opinion stating, “the link between 
the Act of Appeals and Collecteana satis copiosa is manifest - even more so if drafts of the act are 
examined.”
42 The text of the Act o f Appeals is replicated in Elton, Tudor Constitution. 353-358.
43 Nicolson, 20. At the same time that the Collecteana was being researched in England, Henry was 
attempting to find evidence of England’s imperial status in the Papal archives of other European 
libraries.
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According to Walter Ullman, the practices of the Roman emperors directly 
influenced Henry’s understanding of imperial kingship. In Ullman’s words, “Henry 
conceived ‘the imperial crown’ as the sum-total of all the rights and functions which 
the late Roman emperor had, hence rex who in his kingdom was imperator.” 44 These 
rights of the Roman emperors were based on the distinction between public and 
private law as delineated by Ulpian, a quintessential Roman legal authority. The role 
of the emperor was to control all things under the purview of public law, which 
encompassed the administration of both civil and ecclesiastic matters.
Of greatest import to Henry was Constantine’s execution of this law-based 
role 45 Constantine had exercised his authority through calling and managing the 
Council of Nicaea, assembled to determine theological doctrine on the Trinity. In his 
actions at Nicaea, Constantine clearly distinguished between his right to control the 
external workings of the church, and issues of faith, which fell under the control of 
religious authorities alone. Like Constantine, Henry did not wish to interfere in 
interior, spiritual matters, but rather to rule the external affairs of the church. 
Therefore, he found Roman exercise of the public law “particularly suitable [indeed] 
virtually tailored for the situation which [he] faced from about 1529 onwards.”46
Though the Roman Constantine had established the desired jurisdiction over 
the church, it was in Sicilian precedent that Henry found substantiation for his claim 
to territorial sovereignty. During the early sixteenth century, Henry’s Aragonese 
father -in-law, Ferdinand, ruled over Sicily in both the ecclesiastical and temporal
44 Ullman, 198.
45 Ibid., 180-181.
46 Ibid., 179.
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senses. Furthermore, the Pope recognized Ferdinand’s headship over the church 
within his realm. Ullman again infers that the example of Ferdinand’s rule was 
“tailored to suit the needs of his son-in-law” who no doubt was aware of the extensive 
powers exercised by the Aragonese kings in Sicily.47 Their prerogatives had just 
received wide press in 1514 when Ferdinand had ordered a search of the Papal 
archives for the records of their territorial sovereignty. This search proved quite 
successful, and the results were published in the Liber Monarchiae 48 The most 
important document it contained was Urban II’s conferral o f the imperial role vicarius 
Dei on the eleventh-century Norman conquerer of Sicily, Roger I. This papal decree 
rendered the kings of Sicily in all respects equal in authority to the Roman 
emperors.49 Based on Ferdinand’s success in proving his imperial legitimacy, it is no 
wonder than Henry adopted the same precedent-hunting tactics.50
To find further evidence of historic imperial practices, Henry had to look no 
farther than England itself.51 Dale Hoak identifies the “true architect o f the 
symbolism of Tudor ‘imperial’ kingship” as Henry VII, Henry the VIII’s father and 
predecessor.52 In his efforts to buttress the legitimacy of his rule, Henry VII 
attempted to portray himself as an emperor equal in stature to the monarchs of France 
and Germany. To do so, he made extensive iconographic use o f the symbolically 
powerful crown imperial worn by English monarchs. Hoak illustrates how Henry
47 Ibid., 189.
48 Though Ullman does not explicitly say so, his argument could be extended to support the idea that 
this compilation may have served as a model for the Collecteana.
49 Ullman, 189.
50 Ibid., 190.
51 Bracton’s sentences, which were themselves included in the Collecteana, contained a justification of 
English kings’ imperium within their own realm. See Nicolson, p. 23.
52 Hoak, 101.
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enshrined these crown-bearing images of himself on coins and greatly magnified the 
perceived importance of his crown imperial through woodcuts and art. As John Guy 
notes, it was also Henry VII who greatly diminished the status of the church during 
his reign by means of crippling taxation and churchly appointments based on political 
expediency rather than religious considerations.54
Based on Hoak’s and Guy’s characterization of Henry VII, Henry VIII was in 
many ways simply following in the imperial footsteps of his father. Indeed as Hoak 
concludes, “he [Henry VIII] had been taught to ‘see’ the symbolic meaning of the 
closed [imperial] crown of England long before he changed his ‘jurysidiccion and 
dignite ryall’ to a ‘crown or imperial jurisdiction.’”55 In other words, the image of 
himself as an emperor had been inculcated into his self-consciousness at a very young 
age, and therefore Henry always believed himself to possess the authority of an 
emperor in his own realm. In Ullman’s words, “it was this monarchic principle which 
from his pre-coronation time down to the mid-1530s was in Henry’s mind. This was 
the basis which inspired his opposition to papal jurisdiction.”56 As Virginia Murphy 
put it, “his uncompromising position inevitably set him on a course of confrontation 
with the papacy.”57
The first indication of friction between Henry’s imperialism and papal 
jurisdiction came in 1510 in the French city of Toumai. Upon conquering this French 
territory, Henry assumed supremacy over both the lay and spiritual populations, an
53 Ibid., 65, 77.
54 Guy, “Intellectual Origins,” 174.
55 Hoak, 103.
56 Ullman, 195.
57 Murphy, 158.
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authority that he did not similarly possess in his English kingdom. Thomas Mayer 
asserts that the opportunity presented by Toumai proved to be the “mechanism by 
which the arsenal of [imperial] arguments became available to Henry and 
Cromwell.”58 In other words, in Toumai Henry could effect Roman control of the 
public law. He exercised this authority by bestowing Toumai’s bishopric on Cardinal 
Wolsey, thereby increasing his own influence over the religious affairs of the region. 
However, the Pope named a Frenchman, Louis Guillard, to the post apparently 
without consulting Henry first and thereby nullifying his claim to final jurisdiction. 
Henry’s indignation over this blatant affront to his “royal sovereignty” was aroused 
and his rather bombastic letters to the Pope resulted in the return of the position to 
Wolsey.59 The Pope at this time, Leo X, succumbed to Henry’s diatribe rather 
unceremoniously, stating that he never intended to “encroach on Henry’s ‘maiestate et 
amplitudine.’”60
In his Toumain argument against the Pope, Henry had clearly asserted two of 
Guy’s three tenets of “national sovereignty” that would underlie the king’s actions in 
the 1530s: secular imperium and provincial self-determination.61 Henry’s choice to 
oppose the Pope through a direct attack on his papal supremacy is also characteristic 
of his policies in the 1530s. Though he most likely could have reinstated Wolsey by a 
humble application to the Pope, the method that Wolsey himself advocated, Henry 
chose to advance his sweeping claims of independent power. His divorce from
58 Mayer, 28.
59 Ibid., 19.
60 Ibid., 24.
61 Guy, “Intellectual Origins,” 159.
62 Mayer, 19.
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Catherine of Aragon could have been argued on equally conventional grounds, but 
Henry again rejected this non-presumptive solution in favor of denying the Pope’s 
power to dispense at all. Clearly, Henry was unwilling to compromise his “very high 
view of his kingship.”63 Guy argues that it was this unabashed “egoism” that 
prevented Henry from procuring a divorce from Clement; “he sought a papal 
annulment... for a reason humiliating to the papacy.”64 Though one Pope may have 
yielded to Henry’s self-righteous claims of sovereignty in Toumai, Clement VII 
would prove less subservient.
Mayer has argued for the key role that Toumai played in the development of 
Henry’s imperialism, titling his chapter, “On the road to 1534...” and asserting that 
“the case of Toumai led Henry to take a long step toward the 1530s.”65 Though 
Henry could not possibly have been basing his actions on what was to come, certain 
similarities are evident between his policies in Toumai in the mid 1510s and those 
concerning the divorce case in the 1530s. Mayer describes how Henry not only 
claimed a greater jurisdiction over Toumai than he practiced in England but that he 
“turned to some of the same tools to enforce his sovereignty as would play integral 
parts in the Tudor revolution, parliament and the common law.”66
Despite this convincing list of his imperialist tendencies, we must be careful 
not to treat Henry’s actions as conscious precursors to the events of the 1530s. 
Whether or not he did indeed harbor long-standing imperial intentions, the 
redefinition of England as an empire became politically expedient as the 1530s
63 Ibid., 11.
64 John Guy, Tudor Eneland. 117.
65 Mayer, 30.
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unfolded. Both Murphy and Ullman cite Henry’s aging wife and lack of a male heir 
as the most immediate catalysts for his actions.67 Like the exercise of territorial 
sovereignty, establishing a secure succession was essential to Henry’s concept of 
strong imperial kingship. As Ulman notes, “for Henry, the public interest demanded a 
male successor.”68 His failure to produce the necessary male heir “weighed heavily 
on [Henry’s] mind” at the close of the 1520s, as did his growing affection for Anne 
Boleyn.69
Henry expressed his concerns over his marriage with Catherine in Henricus 
Octavius, the most significant of a series of “little books” which embodied the king’s
*1A
stance on the divorce issue. Though Henry probably did not compose the majority 
of the book, he certainly was involved in its compilation. The argument presented by 
the book was founded on the biblical passage from Leviticus that forbade a man from 
marrying his brother’s wife on penalty of “childlessness.”71 Believing his current 
marriage to be cursed, Henry desired another in which he could legitimately produce 
sons. He further claimed that no marriage of this type could be dispensed by papal 
authority because it transgressed the law of God. If the Pope at this point had 
conceded that his predecessor’s dispensation had been unfounded and granted Henry 
an annulment, Henry’s desire for a divorce and his imperialistic views may never 
have converged. However, when Henry realized that the Pope was unwilling to
66 Ibid., 16-17.
67 Ullman, 178; Murphy, 148.
68 Ullman, 179.
69 Ibid.
70 For a fuller discussion of Henricus Octavius and the logic behind Henry’s divorce from Catherine 
see Murphy, “The Literature and Propaganda of Henry VIII’s First Divorce.”
71 According to Murphy, Henry’s coterie was able to translate the phrase without children as without 
sons by referring to the Hebrew rather than the Latin scripture. See p. 139.
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cooperate, England’s potential imperial status presented itself as the solution to 
Henry’s “great matter.”
Where before, Henry’s scholars had been concerned with validating his claim 
for divorce, they now began to concentrate on substantiating the king’s jurisdiction 
over spiritual affairs, no doubt with one particular affair in mind. Murphy asserts that 
in the spring of 1531 the printing of the Censurae academiarum, a much expanded 
revision of Henricus Octavius, demonstrated this new direction. Founded on the 
same Levitican injunction, the Censurae encouraged bishops actively to resist 
wrongful dispensations on the part of the papacy. According to Murphy, this book 
implied that “the government was considering taking practical steps in England to 
achieve the divorce.” The episcopal resistance posited by the Censurae coincided 
well with the imperial jurisdiction afforded Henry by the Collecteana, which he first 
saw in late 1530. If England was indeed an empire possessed of spiritual sovereignty, 
and if  bishops were required to overturn the “misguided” views of the papacy, then 
the divorce case could conceivably be decided in England itself.
2. The King-in-Parliament 
In order to create his empire, enact his divorce, and provide a male heir, Henry 
needed the statutory legitimacy that was attainable only through parliament. Up to 
this point I have made little mention of parliament’s role in the events of Henry’s 
reign before the 1530s. I chose to do so in order to demonstrate the intensely personal
72 Murphy, 155-157.
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nature of Henry’s imperial kingship. Though he certainly employed the intellectual 
efforts of others, he was an active force in the establishment of policy in England, and 
he directed this policy toward the aggrandizement of his own power and influence. 
The most prominent features of his policies were his obsession with imperialism and 
his belief in his own divinely-ordained supremacy. This view of his royal power, I am 
quite sure, left no room in the political equation for parliament.
As established by the Act of Appeals (1533) and the Act of Supremacy (1534), 
Henry was indeed the supreme head of church and state. Parliament theoretically 
played no part in the origination of the king’s supremacy, only acknowledging those 
powers that God had bestowed on him.74 However, in point of fact, the English 
Reformation was as much a result of parliamentary legislation as it was of God’s will. 
As explained by Elton, Henry’s “dignity as supreme head he owed to God and God’s 
law; the reality of his powers as supreme head he owed to the common law,” as 
enacted by parliament. Unlike those emperors of Rome with whom he wished to 
compare himself, Henry did not possess sole legislative sovereignty. Instead, he 
required the cooperation of his Lords and Commons to establish the laws of his 
empire. Therefore, if Henry wanted his personal supremacy to be recognized in law 
and enforceable in the courts of the land, he had no choice but to enlist parliament’s 
assistance in his imperial reformation.
73 Guy, Tudor England. 129. Guy asserts that as a “theocratic king” Henry could “summon the bishops, 
or an English church council, to pronounce his divorce, and then enforce their decision by proclamation 
or act of parliament.”
74 Elton, Tudor Constitution. 342.
75 Elton, “Lex Terrae Victrix, ” 25.
76 Elton, “Lex Terrae Victrix, ” 22.
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Though Henry himself may have viewed parliament as an expedient tool to 
accomplish his imperial ends, Thomas Cromwell, his chief minister, recognized 
parliament’s potential to limit Henry’s absolutism.77 As stated by Guy, “Cromwell 
opposed ‘imperial’ kingship if ‘empire’ meant the Crown’s right to rule without the
• 7&consent of parliament.” Cromwell endeavored to fashion a constitutional monarchy 
in which parliament and the king would perform interdependent roles in the law-
• 70making process. By enacting the religious and political aspects of the Reformation 
through statute, he did just this, effectively establishing parliament’s permanent role 
in Tudor government. As Henry’s children would discover, what had been legislated 
by parliament could not be undone by royal will.
Cromwell’s personal experience as a member of parliament and his close 
correspondence with Tudor common lawyers convinced him of parliament’s 
legislative significance. He was particularly influenced by the parliamentary theories 
of Christopher St. German. An octogenerian by the 1530s, St. German was a well-
ftfipublished and respected champion of the common law. During the tumultuous 
years of the early 1530s, St. German’s advocacy for the universal application of 
parliamentary statute led him into a widely publicized feud with Thomas More, who
77 Guy, Tudor England. 371; Guy, “Intellectual Origins,” 169.
78 Guy, Tudor England. 133.
79 G. R. Elton, “The Political Creed of Thomas Cromwell,” chap. in Studies in Tudor and Stuart 
Politics and Government vol. 2, Parliament/Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1974), 233.
80 John Guy, “Thomas More and Christopher St. German: The Battle of the Books,” in Reassessing the 
Henrician Age, eds. Alistair Fox and John Guy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 99-100. St. German’s 
popularity sprang partially from his decision to publish his writings in English rather than the 
traditional French. According to Guy, his Doctor and Student and the New Additions supplement went 
through “numerous editions; it was on sale in rival commercial editions within twelve months of initial 
publication, it was a standard law text for English legal students in the sixteenth century.”
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was ultimately martyred for his rejection of parliamentary ascendancy.81 According 
to Guy, their heated debate was “akin to a major political confrontation in the daily 
newspaper.”82
Galvanized by a strident anticlericalism, St. German made the unprecedented 
suggestion that the king-in-parliament had the authority to legislate on both spiritual 
and temporal issues as early as 1530.83 He even went so far as to claim that the 
divorce Henry so badly desired could be achieved by an act of the king-in-
• 84 r ,parliament. Though Cromwell did not adopt this secular solution to the divorce, he 
was attracted to St. German’s radical theory of the king-in-parliament for two reasons: 
first, it provided a rationale for parliament’s omnicompetence by raising statutory 
common law over canon law, and second, the notion of the king-in-parliament 
theoretically “neutralized” Henry’s absolutism by stipulating that Henry could 
exercise his imperialism only as a member of the tripartite body of parliament.85 In 
other words, St. German asserted that the mixed body of the ‘king-in-parliament’ 
rather than the ‘vicar of God’ was the ‘high sovereign over the people.’86
Cromwell incorporated St. German’s notion of mixed sovereignty into the 
very statues that secured the Reformation and Henrician imperialism. The text of the 
Dispensations Act (1534) reads “your Royal Majesty and your Lords spiritual and
81 Elton, “Lex Terrae Victrix,” 23.
82 Guy, “Battle of the Books,” 111.
83 St. German repeatedly made this claim in the New Additions to Doctor and Student, ed. T. F. T. 
Plucknett and J. L. Barton (London: Seldon Society, 1974), 317-340. When referring to parliament, he 
included the king as a member of this body, stating, “there was a lawe made... in the parlyament holden 
in the .xxi. yere of our souerayne lorde kynge Henry the .viii. by the assente of he kynge, and of all the 
lordes spirituall and temporall of the realme, and of all the commons...,” 317.
84 Guy, “Henrician Age”, 111.
85 Guy, “Henrician Age,” 28.
86 Quoted in Guy, “Henrician Age,” 29.
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temporal and Commons, representing the whole state of your realm in this your most 
High Court of Parliament...”87 Similarly, the Act of Proclamations (1539) posits a 
single authoritative body: “be it therefore enacted by the authority of this present 
Parliament, with the King’s Majesty’s, his Lords spiritual and temporal and the 
Commons’ assent...”88 By far the most influential Act to contain both Cromwell’s 
parliamentary focus and Henry’s imperial perspective was the Act of Appeals (1533). 
According to Guy, this Act contained a “dramatic internal contradiction;” it 
simultaneously declared Henry’s caesaropapism and parliament’s omnicompetence, 
two absolute powers that presumably could not exist together in one government.89
Guy contends that the Act may have represented a compromise between Henry 
and Cromwell.90 Though the legendary preamble established England’s imperialism 
and Henry’s supreme headship, in the body of the text Cromwell “shifted the focus 
away from theological principles and from the nature of the king’s supremacy, to 
parliament’s defense of the temporal interest of the realm.” Nicolson further explains 
that during the lengthy drafting stage, Cromwell circumscribed the act to a large 
extent, “cut[ting] out the explicit statements of the derivation of all jurisdiction from 
the king.”91 The original drafts themselves show that as many times as Cromwell 
deleted these references, Henry himself wrote them back in.
87 Quoted in Elton, Tudor Constitution. 361.
88 Ibid., 28.
89 Guy, Tudor England. 371; Guy, “Intellectual Origins,” 172.
90 Guy, “Intellectual Origins,” 172.
91 Nicolson, 29.
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As Guy persuasively argues, the passing of the Act resulted in an “ambiguity 
[that] permeated the theory of supremacy for the remainder of the Tudor period.”92 
Theoretically, Tudor imperial kingship rested on the foundation of mixed monarchy. 
However, it would be inaccurate to conclude that this ambiguity led to overt political 
conflict during Henry’s reign. According to Elton, just the opposite was the case. 
Henry’s realm was characterized by a harmonious relationship between Crown and 
parliament in which both gained in status and worked in concert to legislate the 
Reformation and Henry’s succession. Elton attributes this “harmony” to superb 
management by both Cromwell, who sought to maintain a productive partnership 
between Crown and parliament, and Henry, whose personal magnetism and 
commanding presence neutralized animosity toward his policies.93 Henry himself 
acknowledged the cooperative role of the king-in-parliament during his reign in 1542 
when he noted that “we at no time stand so highly in our estate royal as in the time of 
Parliament, where in we as head and you as members are conjoined and knit together 
into one body politic....”94
Having gained the imperial title he desperately coveted, Henry seemed to lose 
little by this admission, and, in practice, the men of parliament rarely questioned the 
judgments of their powerful male monarch. Ideologically, however, Cromwell’s 
inclusion o f St. German’s joint ruling body portended a revolution in the 
governmental role of parliament. Though previously omitted from political treatises, 
after the 1530s parliament became an “automatic point of reference” in the thinking of
92 Guy, Tudor England, 133.
93 Elton, “Political Creed”, 235; Elton, Tudor Constitution. 312.
94 Quoted in Elton, Tudor Constitution. 177.
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proponents of constitutional monarchy.95 During Elizabeth’s reign, the institution 
was clearly conceived as a limiting force on royal power by many political theorists, 
among them the religious figure John Aylmer in An Harbor owe fo r Faithfull and 
Trewe Subjects and the well-known politician Sir Thomas Smith in De Republica 
Anglorum .96 This empire of England, so far removed from being ruled by an absolute 
monarch, would now be defined by the mixed sovereignty of its king or queen-in- 
parliament.
3. The Royal Succession 
Though Henry and Cromwell may have maintained the well-oiled machine of 
the king-in-parliament, the question remained as to whether this same unity of 
purpose would endure between Crown and parliament in the reigns of his successors. 
To a significant extent, Henry’s own machinations on the issue of the succession 
determined that the answer to this question would be a resounding no. In his quest to 
secure the imperial kinship of Tudor monarchs by producing a male heir, Henry made 
his succession and his children’s imperialism severely problematic.
Immediately following his divorce from Catherine of Aragon and remarriage 
to Anne Boleyn, Henry and parliament passed his first Succession Act (1534), 
bastardizing his daughter Mary and placing Anne’s future offspring in line for the 
throne. Exercising his new authority as the divinely-chosen supreme head of the 
Church of England, Henry arranged for the text of the Act to closely imitate the
95 Elton, “Body of the Whole Realm,” 23.
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lengthy biblical prohibitions on incest, thereby using his “unnatural” marriage with 
Catherine to make a more general statement on the evils of incestuous relations. As 
explained by Bruce Boehrer, despite Henry’s confidence in his own ability to interpret 
God’s will, “the first Succession Act - which places itself in the rhetorical position of 
God’s own scriptural word - suffers from the irony that while speaking for God, it has 
the disadvantage of lacking his omniscience.”97
Indeed, within two years of the first Act, Henry began to fear that the curse 
God had placed upon him for incest had not been lifted. Anne’s seeming inability to 
produce a healthy male child prompted Henry to again turn to parliament for a further 
limitation of his succession. Just as he had done to Catherine, Henry blamed Anne 
for participating in incestuous relations, thereby preventing him from attaining the 
illusive male heir. On these grounds, the Succession Act of 1536 annulled Henry’s 
marriage to Anne and proclaimed Elizabeth as well as Mary to be illegitimate and 
“utterly foreclosed, excluded, and barred to claim... any inheritance as lawful heir to 
your Highness by lineal descent.”98 The new order of succession promoted Jane 
Seymour’s potential children to heirs apparent while investing Henry with the 
unprecedented power to stipulate the succession through his last will and testament.99
In 1544, satisfied that a queen had finally bore him a male heir, Henry and 
parliament reinstated his daughters in the succession after Edward in order of their
96 John Aylmer, An Harborowe for Faithfull and Trewe Subjects (New York: De Capo Press, Inc., 
1972); Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum. ed. Mary Dewar (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982).
97 Bruce Boehrer, Monarchy and Incest in Renaissance England: Literature. Culture. Kinship, and 
Kingship (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992,) 2.
98 Quoted in Levine, Dynastic Problems. 156.
99 See text of Second Succession Act in Mortimer Levine, Tudor Dynastic Problems (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1973), 156.
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birth. Crucially, the king-in-parliament never overturned those previous acts that had 
proclaimed Mary and Elizabeth illegitimate and nullified their respective claims to the 
throne. The Succession Act of 1544 also declared that this order of succession and 
that which would be contained in Henry’s last will and testament could not be altered, 
even by his heirs, on penalty of treason.100
Henry’s will is perhaps the most remarkable piece of legislation in this series 
of erratic and often contradictory limitations on the succession. As stipulated by the 
Second Succession Act of 1536, after his only legitimate heir, Edward, Henry could 
determine the order of succession without being held to the strictures of heredity, law, 
or custom. Mortimer Levine succinctly expresses the import of this discretionary 
authority; “no English monarch before or since has ever had this statutory power.”101 
To succeed Edward, Henry chose his two bastardized daughters and the offspring of 
his youngest rather than his eldest sister, whom he excluded on account of their
1 noforeign birth. The king-in-parliament summarily gave Henry’s will the force of 
statutory law in 1546. Thus, by numerous succession acts, the threat o f treason, and 
the force of law, Henry sought to bind his heirs to his own royal will. In reality, he 
rendered them permanently dependent on parliament.
At the most basic level, Henry made the succession, which had previously 
been considered a private matter of royal prerogative, a public issue by including 
parliament in the decision-making process. He called on parliament specifically to 
address the crisis resulting from Anne Boleyn’s failure to produce an heir in 1536,
100 See text of Third Succession Act in Levine, Dynastic Problems. 162.
101 Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 67.
102 See text of Heniy’s will in Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 163.
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and did so again in 1540 when he desired to free himself of Anne of Cleves.103 Even 
his authority to determine the succession though his will, arguably his most imperial 
maneuver, required parliamentary approval to become law. In these and other matters 
dealing with the succession, Henry probably viewed parliament as an expedient 
means to transform his will into law. But, whatever his true intentions, he created a 
powerful precedent for parliament’s participation in the succession, a precedent that 
vexed each of his children. Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth respectively discovered that 
they could not alter Henry’s succession without parliament’s consent because his will 
was enshrined in statute. Only the joint body of the king-in-parliament could 
transcend this legal obstacle to royal will. As Elton quipped, “the only creatures not 
bound to parliament were its successors.”104
Mary and Elizabeth were even more deeply bound to parliament because their 
very titles were founded on statute rather than hereditary right. Still legally 
illegitimate when they inherited the throne, Henry’s daughters were forced to enlist 
parliament to overturn Henry’s bastardizing legislation and proclaim valid their 
claims to the throne.105 This parliamentary legitimacy was also necessary to 
overcome the taint of incest Henry had bequeathed to his daughters. In his endeavors 
to vilify Catherine and Anne and vindicate himself, Henry had constructed a “thick 
gauze of incestuous narrative. [With] both their mothers adjudged guilty of incest at 
different times, neither daughter could advance an absolutely unconflicted claim to
103 Jennifer Loach, Parliament Under the Tudors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 89.
104 Elton, “Body of the Whole Realm,” 52.
105 See “An Act Declaring Mary I Legitimate” and “An Act of Recognition of the Queen’s Highness’ 
Title to the Imperial Crown of the Realm” in Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 171, 176.
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the English crown.”106 During the early part of her reign, Elizabeth’s title was 
repeatedly contested by much of Catholic Europe through the person of Mary Queen 
of Scots, who claimed the throne for herself on account of Elizabeth’s illegitimacy.107 
In effect, Henry rang the death knell for hereditary divine right and imperial kingship 
when he imperiled his daughters’ legal and sexual legitimacy. Though carrying out 
his legislative revolution through parliamentary means did little to undermine Henry’s 
own imperial power, his children would ultimately pay the price for his expedient 
inclusion of parliament in determining the royal succession.
106 Boehrer, 3, 45.
107 Jones, Elizabethan Age. 138.
CHAPTER TWO 
Elizabeth I: A Woman Who Refused to be Counseled
1. Precedents of those less “mete” to rule 
Though Henry’s decisions regarding the succession were erratic and a source 
of political and religious consternation, the men in parliament did not question his 
authority to make them. The same cannot be said for his children, whose reigns were 
marked by parliamentary opposition to monarchical policies on the related issues of 
marriage and the succession. As explained by John Aylmer, in a political tract written 
on the eve of Elizabeth’s accession, women and children sovereigns were not as fit to 
make wise decisions as mature male monarchs and therefore required more guidance. 
In general, he wrote, “the male is more mete to rule then the female” and “King 
Edward for his years and tenderness of age was not so mete to rule, as was his father 
King Henry.” The less-than-mete status of Henry’s children thus encouraged 
parliament to take a more active role in determining the succession where it had 
offered only passive consent during Henry’s reign.
On his deathbed, Edward and his advisors constructed a will stipulating the 
accession of his Protestant cousin Jane Grey in place of his Catholic half-sister Mary. 
Edward contrived this change in the line of succession both because he regarded Jane 
as his “spiritual sister” who would continue to carry out his godly reformation and
108 Aylmer, sig. 12v; C4r.
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because he considered both Mary and Elizabeth illegitimate and thus unable to occupy 
the throne.109 In spite of the young king’s divine will, this royal limitation of the 
succession proved untenable and even treasonable because it had not been enacted by 
the king-in-parliament. Following Edward’s death, the extra-parliamentary coup to 
alter the succession in favor of the Lady Jane also failed and, as stipulated by Henry’s 
will, Mary inherited the throne. Crucially, only Henry’s will was considered 
legitimate because it had been given the force of statute by parliamentary consent.110
Despite Henry’s final endorsement of Mary as the rightful heir to the throne, 
Edward had not been mistaken about Mary’s illegitimate legal status. In his First and 
Second Succession Acts (1534 and 1536), Henry had bastardized his eldest daughter. 
The text of the Second Act reads, “the issue bom of the same unlawful marriage, shall 
be deemed illegitimate... [and shall be] barred to claim, challenge, or demand any 
inheritance as lawful heir to your Highness by lineal descent.”111 In order to overturn 
their former legislation, Mary summoned parliament to pass “An Act Declaring Mary
119I Legitimate.” This Act resacralized Henry’s marriage to Catherine, reinstated 
Mary’s claim to the throne, and reaffirmed parliament’s role in determining the royal 
succession. The Act can also be interpreted as an expansion of parliament’s role 
since Mary’s sovereignty, unlike Henry’s, appeared to rest on the authority of a 
parliamentary statute. Mary’s dependence on parliament for her very title clearly 
compromised Tudor imperial kingship as it was understood by her father.
109 Dale Hoak, “End Game: The Succession Crisis of 1553,” in The Reign of Edward VI (Forthcoming, 
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In matters of religion, Mary also discovered her reliance on parliament: what 
had been done by parliament could only be undone by the same. Calling five 
parliaments in five years, Mary found her male MPs willing to repeal the Henrician 
and Edwardian religious settlements and restore England to the Catholic faith. To 
Mary’s frustration, these men proved less congenial to her plans for marriage and the 
succession. As an imperial monarch, Mary did not believe it her duty to discuss her 
marital affairs with the men in parliament, but under mounting pressure from her 
Commons, she admitted a deputation in November of 1553 to address the subject. In 
their speech, the MPs encouraged Mary to marry quickly, as the succession was 
unsettled, and to marry an Englishman, as a foreign male consort could conspire to 
seize the throne for himself. Mary, who had secretly pledged herself to Philip of 
Spain in late October, was understandably annoyed at Parliament’s unsolicited advice. 
Her retort that “parliament was not accustomed to use such language to the kings of 
England,” was accurate; parliament had never asked a single, male monarch to marry 
and certainly would not presume to limit his marital choices.113
Ignoring parliament’s counsel, Mary made public her betrothal to Philip the 
day after the legislative body had been dissolved. In reaction to the specter of a 
Spanish marriage, a number of MPs, and other of Mary’s subjects, joined Wyatt’s 
rebellion. Though the uprising was unsuccessful in preventing the queen’s marriage 
to Philip, it did procure a noteworthy promise from Mary herself. Mary pledged not
112 Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 171.
113 Loach, Parliament Linder the Tudors. 94; De la Torre, 124-5.
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to marry without the consent of the realm, a breach of autonomy not previously 
granted by English monarchs.114
At this point, it is crucial to consider the motivations behind parliament’s 
unprecedented actions. Why had parliament found it necessary both to exhort the 
queen to marry and to warn against a foreigner? Why had some extremists rebelled 
against their sovereign’s choice of a marriage partner? As de la Torre persuasively 
argues, Mary’s gender prompted the all-male parliament to interfere in issues that had 
previously been considered matters of royal prerogative.115 Mary’s male consort was 
much more important than a male monarch’s spouse because in the gender hierarchy 
of marriage, the MPs believed, the husband would wield greater power.116 The 
xenophobic English had little desire to see their female monarch subordinate to a 
powerful Spaniard.
These gendered assumptions led parliament to pass two statutes that, in effect, 
restricted the queen’s sovereign will. After creating a marriage treaty between Mary 
and Philip that rendered Philip almost powerless, parliament took the unprecedented 
action of turning the treaty into statute. This action could be considered a response to 
Mary’s promise to obtain the realm’s consent on her marriage, but from a gendered 
perspective, it suggests that parliament felt only the highest form of the law could 
circumvent the natural hierarchy of marriage.117 As stipulated in the law, Mary “as 
our onely Quene, shal and may solye and as a sole quene use, have, and enioye the
114 Loach, Marv Tudor. 15.
115 De la Torre, 121-125.
116 Judith M. Richards, “Mary Tudor as ‘Sole Quene’?: Gendering Tudor Monarchy,” The Historical 
Journal 40(1997): 907.
117 De la Torre, 129.
40
Crowne and Soverayntye....”118 MPs therefore took the greatest precaution that the 
“onely and sole Quene” Mary, not her husband Philip, would rule England. In the 
words of Judith Richards, “every effort was being made, it seemed, to ensure that 
‘monarchy’ took precedence over ‘female’.119
Parliament also made it clear to Mary that Philip would not be crowned as the 
king of England, an event that both the English and Spanish considered symbolically 
necessary to legitimize Philip’s power. The role of a king consort was still so 
ambiguous that parliament feared Philip’s crowning would make him an anointed 
king invested with a royal authority that “could override anything previously agreed 
by international treaty or confirmed by parliamentary statute.”120 Though Mary 
claimed that she would crown Philip on her own initiative, the resistance she would
meet in parliament convinced her not to do so, despite the fact that a consort’s
•  1^1 coronation had clearly been a matter of royal prerogative in previous reigns.
A second statute, which purported to buttress Mary’s rule as a married
woman, also circumscribed her sovereignty. Because she was female, parliament
worried that upon her marriage, Mary, like any other woman, would become a feme
covert. That is, she would no longer legally be considered an autonomous person but
an appendage of her husband. Parliament obviously found this legal subordination
problematic in the case of a female monarch, especially one marrying a foreign
prince. Therefore, it passed an act stating that queens of England enjoyed the same
powers as kings, “any custom, use, or scruple, or any other thing whatsoever to be
118 Quoted in Richards, 908-909.
119 Richards, 909.
120 Ibid., 921-922.
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made to the contrary notwithstanding.”122 The fact that this statute was enacted, 
however, implied that queens were not inherently equal to kings. Indeed, the Act 
suggested that a queen could not rule as sovereign without a parliamentary statute. 
According to de la Torre, from this perspective, “parliament’s own power seemed 
augmented. It was sanctioning the rule of the sovereign, and did so only because that 
sovereign happened to be woman.”123
Thus, Mary’s status as a female monarch proved decisive in the extension of 
parliament’s legislative purview into royal marriages and the succession. As argued 
by de la Torre, parliament’s increasing interference was not the product of some 
conspiracy to usurp sovereignty from the monarch but was rather predicated on their 
fear o f Philip’s power as a husband.124 Though parliament could not stop Mary from 
marrying Philip, they sought to strip him of his marital superiority and refused to 
endorse his coronation, all against the queen’s express wishes.125 Parliament also 
thwarted the queen’s desires in regard to the succession. According to Jennifer 
Loach, they were “successful in preventing the queen from altering the constitutional 
powers and position of either her husband or her sister.”126 Though Mary intended to 
disinherit Elizabeth because of her “heretical opinions, illegitimacy, and
121 Loach, Marv Tudor. 196; De la Torre, 133.
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characteristics in which she resembled her mother,” she never broached the subject 
with her parliaments, realizing they were loath to overturn Henry’s statutory will.127
Loach suggests that “certainly an idea existed that Henry VIII’s will, and the 
order of the succession therein contained, could not be altered” but she does not 
explore why this may have been the case.128 Why indeed were neither Edward nor 
Mary granted parliamentary sanction to replace Henry’s will with their own when 
Henry himself had changed the succession four times? John Aylmer provided the 
answer: women and children, even if they were monarchs, could not be trusted to 
perceive what was best for England. In both Mary and Edward’s reigns, male MPs 
appeared more inclined to protect what they deemed the future safety of the realm 
than to follow the royal whims of a minor, who supported an unlawful heir, and a 
woman, who made a poor marital choice. Though Loach refers to parliament’s 
opposition to Mary’s policies as “passive resistance,” it seems to me that parliament 
took a decidedly active, masculine role in limiting their female monarch’s 
prerogative, a trend that would continue under Elizabeth.129
In an effort to fend off the parliamentary interference that had troubled her 
sister, Elizabeth claimed that her marriage and the succession were matters of arcana 
imperii. That is, these issues were mysteries of state that fell under the private 
purview of the imperial monarch. Unfortunately for Elizabeth, the precedent for 
public discussion of the succession was by now well entrenched, and like her sister, 
Elizabeth herself was dependent on parliament for her claim to the throne. If, as
127 Quoted in Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 172.
128 Loach, Marv Tudor, 196-7.
129 Loach, Mary Tudor. 231.
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Elizabeth claimed* parliament could not determine the succession, she would 
undermine the legitimacy of the very acts that made her queen.131 Clearly, the 
relationship between Crown and parliament had changed significantly since Henry’s 
reign. Though Henry’s children still described themselves as imperial kings, their 
imperialism was decidedly less autonomous and subject to greater “guidance” on the 
part of parliament. Parliament was no longer a rubber-stamp institution that simply 
consented to the monarch’s decisions. Instead, MPs actively influenced royal 
marriage and the succession, going so far as to thwart the sovereign’s will on these 
issues.
By the time of Elizabeth’s accession, her counselors had adopted a “political
creed” that reflected the precedents of former Tudor reigns. According to John Guy
and Stephen Alford, this creed was composed of three elements: sovereignty
belonged to the queen-in-parliament as defined by St. German and Cromwell in
Henry’s reign; imperial prerogative was limited by the counsel of parliament; the
consent of the whole realm in parliament was required to determine issues of religion 
1and the succession. Resonating with the rhetoric of counsel, this creed exposed the 
latent tensions between conciliarism and imperial kingship, as it was understood by 
Henry VIII and the independent-minded Elizabeth. Written ostensibly in support of 
Elizabeth’s imperial claim to the throne, John Aylmer’s 1559 Harbor owe fo r Faithful
130 Guy, Tudor Monarchy. 95; Guy, “Rhetoric of Counsel,” 352.
131 Loach, Parliament Under the Tudors. 109.
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and Trewe Subjects provides a window into the potential conciliar erosion of imperial 
kingship under a female queen and a male parliament.
2. An Harborowe fo r Faithfull and Trewe Subjects
In 1558 the Scottish reformer John Knox published a rabid attack on 
queenship entitled the First Blast o f  the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment o f  
Women. Knox had directed his Blast specifically against the Catholic reigns of Mary 
of Guise, regency queen of Scotland; Catherine de Medici, queen mother of France; 
and Mary Tudor, queen of England. Unfortunately for the Protestant Knox, by the 
time the Blast reached the public, Mary Tudor had died and her sister Elizabeth, a 
Protestant queen, occupied the English throne. The poor timing of his vindictive tract 
caused considerable concern among other Protestant reformers, many of whom were 
Marian exiles who wished to return to England with Elizabeth’s blessing. These 
theologians surmised, quite rightly, that Knox’s harsh words would damage their own 
reputations. In an attempt to declare his support for Elizabeth, and denounce his 
association with Knox, John Aylmer, the Marian exile and future bishop of London,
t o o
wrote his Harborowe fo r Faithfull and Trewe Subjects.
Though both reformers relied on scriptural passages to construct their 
arguments, Knox chose to emphasize universal ordinances that applied to all women,
133 There is some dissension over the level of disagreement between Knox and Aylmer. Patricia-Ann 
Lee perceives these men in opposition to one another. She states that Knox considered the rule of 
women to be universally prohibited by God while Aylmer regarded Elizabeth as an exceptional female 
whose rule was legitimate and would be mitigated by the male figures of God and parliament. In 
contrast, Anne McLaren argues that their treatises were “variations on the same theme” of 
circumscribing the sovereignty of female monarchs. See A. N. McLaren, “Delineating the Elizabethan 
Body Politic: Knox, Aylmer and the Definition of Counsel 1558-88,” History of Political Thought
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where Aylmer focused on examples of women who had transcended these 
stereotypes. To Knox, all women, including female monarchs, had been tainted by 
the sins o f Eve and permanently occupied a subordinate position in the divinely- 
ordained sexual order.134 St. Paul had reaffirmed God’s condemnation of women’s 
lack of reason when he barred women from speaking in public because of their false 
prophesizing. From Knox’s theological perspective, these divine precepts forbidding 
women to speak or rule over men superceded secular laws that allowed women to
1 o r
ascend the throne. Women who had become monarchs were therefore 
“monstrous,” unnatural, and the object of God’s wrath. In order to prove his 
proposition, Knox reminded his readers of the fanatical Catholicism of Mary Tudor.
It was clear to Knox that English Protestants were suffering God’s punishment for 
endorsing the rule of a woman.
To prevent this same apocalyptic logic from being used to resist Elizabeth’s 
rule, Aylmer sought to undermine Knox’s argument that Mary Tudor’s behavior was 
representative of women rulers. He first claimed that Mary herself was innocent but 
had been deceived by conspiring Papists. He wrote, “Queen Mary, who bearing, and 
wearing a woman’s heart, could not (I think), have used such rigor and extremity... 
unless she had been bewitched by her Cardinal, Bishops, and Churchmen.” In this 
manner, he endorsed Knox’s religious enemy, the Papists, but separated the evils of 
Catholicism from the rule of women. Though this explanation effectively removed
XVII No. 2 (Summer 1996).; Patricia-Ann Lee, “A Bodye Politique to Goveme: Aylmer, Knox, and 
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the stain of guilt from Mary, it also undermined her individual agency and autonomy.
This passage thus suggests that Aylmer’s belief in the legitimacy of female rule was
coupled with the perception that female monarchs could be easily manipulated.
Though Mary had allowed herself to be persuaded by the wrong advisors,
Aylmer contended that her poor choices were not those of all female rulers. In other
words, he refused to acknowledge Knox’s argument by generalization. He accused
Knox of mistakenly moving “from the particular to the general,” when instead Mary’s
“folly was an accident to her person, and not proper to her sex.”137 To substantiate his
claim that poor rule was not “proper” to female leaders, he offered the biblical figure
of Deborah, who “judged the people of Israel, and the people resorteth unto her, she
delivered them out of thraldome, and set them at liberty.”138 In addition to Deborah,
he compiled an impressive list of effective women rulers from ancient and modem
history “where by the ordinance of God, and order of law, women have reigned, and 
1those not a few.” In Aylmer’s narrative of scriptural and secular history, women 
had mled well and had not been excluded from positions of power. How then, he 
asked, could Knox claim that women’s rule was universally monstrous and unnatural?
With Mary’s disastrous reign safely categorized as an aberration in a history of 
otherwise capable women rulers, Aylmer proceeded to attack another of Knox’s 
generalizations, namely that God’s will was separate from and antithetical to earthly 
law. According to Aylmer, God’s laws were manifest in human legal customs. In 
particular, he espied the workings of divine will in the succession. Not only was
137 Ibid., sig. B2r, sig. L3r.
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lineal descent a secular practice, but the royal family in question had been specially 
chosen by God. Because this was the case, Aylmer reasoned “for some secret purpose 
He mindeth the female should reign and govern. If we consider the works of God: we 
shall find... that where was least help of man or any worldly means: there wrought He 
greatest wonders and brought things to a most happy end.”140
In other words, if God selected a woman to be the instrument of his will, men 
should not be such “presumptuous fools” to question his wisdom. After all, did he 
not send the boy David to slay the giant Goliath?141 Though Elizabeth may be a 
woman, Aylmer warned his fellow Englishmen not to underestimate her worth in the 
eyes of God. She was not sent as a sign of God’s wrath, as Knox had claimed, but as 
God’s chosen representative on earth. Consequently, she deserved the obedience that 
Englishmen would show to God himself. “It is thy part to know and learn, and after 
to do and perform all manner of duty to her, which occupieth by most just title, the 
imperial throne of this realm.”142
In order to counter Knox’s denunciation of female rule, Aylmer had painted a 
powerful image of Elizabeth and the imperial queenship that she wielded. Legitimate 
in the eyes of God and the law, Aylmer argued that Englishmen were duty-bound to 
follow the sovereign will of this woman whom he described as well-educated, 
modest, and a humble servant of God.143 But, no matter how impressed he was with 
her credentials, Aylmer could not escape the fact that Elizabeth was a woman. While 
her gender did not make her an unnatural ruler as Knox had suggested, it did render
140 Ibid., sig. B2v-B3r.
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her unequal to a male monarch.144 Aylmer described a male sovereign as the major, 
that is “the most natural to preserve and maintain the society of men,” while the 
woman is the minor and therefore not as “convenient [but] not so heinous, and 
intolerable as this man [Knox] maketh it.”145
As a woman, Aylmer considered Elizabeth as impressionable as her sister 
Mary. In his words, her education had “fashioneth and frameth her mind (as Plato 
sayeth) and maketh it tractable as wax, to print in good images of virtues and modest 
manners.”146 In other words, Elizabeth’s education did not prepare her to make 
autonomous decisions but instead molded her to accept the guidance of God and her 
male counselors. Like the biblical Deborah, Elizabeth was regarded as an exceptional 
woman but still expected to “serve in her office as an instrument” of others’ will.147 
Aylmer may have argued that Elizabeth was the rightful holder of the imperial throne, 
but in practice, he believed her gender limited her ability to exercise imperial 
queenship independently. Though Henry’s de facto power was little diminished by 
the apparent compromise between imperial kingship and counsel contained in the Act 
of Appeals, as a female monarch Elizabeth was more susceptible to the implications 
of the Henrician compromise: the advent of mixed and mitigated monarchy.
To ensure his readers that Elizabeth would listen to the right counselors, 
unlike her sister Mary, Aylmer delineated three sources of authority that would
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mitigate her rule: God, the law, and the men in parliament. Aylmer reasoned that just 
as God determined the succession of earthly governments, he ruled as partner with his 
chosen sovereigns. In the case of Elizabeth, this omniscient male guide would make 
up for her female inferiority. “If He join to His strength: she can not be weak. If He 
put to his hand she cannot be feeble, if  He be with her who can stand against her?”148 
If his readers remained unconvinced that God would take such an active role in 
guiding Elizabeth, Aylmer suggested that they need not fear because English 
monarchs did not possess despotic powers. That is, whether male or female, 
sovereigns must abide by the law.149 He wrote, “it is not in England so dangerous a 
matter, to have a woman ruler, as men take it to be: For it is not she that rulleth but 
the laws.”150 Crucially, these laws were made with the consent of the realm by the 
queen-in-parliament. The queen’s decisions would therefore be carefully mitigated by 
this all-male advisory council, the “fathers of the country” as Aylmer called them. In 
his words, “if the parliament use their privileges: the King can ordain nothing 
without them.... Those that in King Henry the VIII’s days would not grant him that 
his proclamations should have the force of statute, were good fathers of the 
country.”151
It had been Thomas Cromwell who formulated the concept of the king-in- 
parliament and faciliated parliament’s actions regarding the Act of Proclamations in 
order to augment parliament’s legislative and advisory role in Tudor government.
148 Aylmer, sig. B3r.
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Theoretically, the relationship between monarch and parliament had remained 
unchanged since Cromwell’s revolution, but as Aylmer’s tract demonstrates, under a 
minor and a woman, the men of parliament had taken on a larger, more active role in 
state matters than Cromwell had envisioned. Aylmer coupled parliament’s 
precedented legislative role with its duty to counsel the queen, being always “at her 
elbow,” to argue that Elizabeth’s rule was less than imperial. In his words, “the 
regiment of England is not a mere monarchy... nor a mere Oligarchy, nor Democracy, 
but a rule mixte of all these, wherein each one of these has or should have like
1 Oauthority.” Thus, while Aylmer’s treatise may have legitimized Elizabeth’s right to 
rule, it also rationalized parliament’s extended role in guiding a female monarch. As 
summarized by de la Torre, Aylmer’s tract suggests “it was not the weak, inferior 
woman who actually formulated policy.... Elizabeth’s actual exercise of political 
power would be mitigated by her male Parliament, and in addressing the succession 
issue, MPs apparently took this theory to heart.”153
3. The Queen’s Two Bodies 
Though Aylmer’s Harbor owe may have been prophetic in terms of his 
suggestions for parliament’s mitigating role, he, like everyone else, never foresaw 
Elizabeth’s obdurate resistance to the guidance of her MPs. As it turned out, 
Elizabeth’s mind was not made of the impressionable wax he had expected: she 
forsook simple dress and advice and, most significantly, refused to marry. When
151 Ibid., sig. H3r.
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writing his Harborowe, Aylmer, of course, could not imagine Elizabeth’s later 
policies and therefore assumed she would fulfill her duties as both woman and 
monarch and marry to produce an heir. With Mary’s Spanish marriage, which had 
pulled England into an unwanted war, still fresh in mind, Aylmer attempted to prove 
that Elizabeth’s duty as a wife would not compromise her ability to rule. To do so, he 
employed the political fiction of the queen’s two bodies.
Tudor common lawyers, most notably Edmund Plowden, used this concept to 
distinguish between the corruptible natural body of the monarch and the immortal 
body of the state that the sovereign possessed during his or her lifetime.154 Though it 
began as an esoteric concept discussed only in the Inns of Court, Marie Axton argues 
that the distinction between the queen’s two bodies appeared in Shakespearean drama, 
iconography, histories, and political tracts, making it a widely recognized concept 
during Elizabeth’s reign.155 Aylmer’s Harborowe was one such document that 
played a role in popularizing the theory. Treating Elizabeth’s two bodies as separate 
entities, Aylmer argued that her body natural could function as a subordinate wife 
while her body politic remained that o f a sovereign monarch. In his words, “so far as 
pertaineth to the bands of marriage, and that office of a wife, she must be subject, but 
as a Magistrate she may be her husband’s head.”156 By employing the two bodies, 
Aylmer thus accomplished the same aim as parliament’s statutory emasculation of
154 The standard source on Plowden and the theory of the two bodies is The King’s Two Bodies by 
Ernst H. Kantorowicz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.) Marie Axton points out, however, 
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bodies, including one by Plowden himself, Kantorowicz concentrated only on Plowden’s Reports. See 
Marie Axton, The Queen’s Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan Succession (London: Royal 
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Mary’s husband Philip: an adaptation of the established gender hierarchy. The 
queen’s superior body politic could transcend her female body natural, enabling 
Elizabeth to remain sovereign within the matrimonial state.
Differentiating Elizabeth’s two bodies also proved useful for Aylmer when he 
wished to convince his audience that, although she might be an all-too-human female, 
the office she held had been divinely ordained. Of monarchs, he wrote, we “should 
behold in them not only flesh and blood, which they have in common with us, but 
also a divine and godly majesty, which they have given them of god. So that we 
should rather fix our eyes upon their office, which is god’s: then upon their person 
which is man’s.” Aylmer’s application of the queen’s two bodies in such distinct 
ways speaks to the flexibility of this theory that was alternately used to describe 
Elizabeth’s bodies as jointly godly and human, public and private, corporate and 
individual, and most significantly, male and female.
The legal concept of the monarch’s two bodies, like the monarch-in- 
parliament, was not invented during Elizabeth’s reign but took on greater implications 
because of that ruler’s female gender. Henry VIII also had two bodies, but the 
divergence between his body natural and body politic, both gendered masculine, did 
not appear so large that they required distinction. In Elizabeth’s case, her female 
gender, which rendered her natural body subordinate, clashed visibly with her 
sovereign male body politic, prompting her subjects to question which of her two 
bodies would predominate. In other words, was Elizabeth a woman who happened to 
be sovereign or a sovereign who happened to be a woman?
156 Ibid., sig. C4v. See also D3r, Glr, G3r.
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As we have already seen, Aylmer and Knox offered opposite answers to this 
question. For Aylmer, though Elizabeth’s gender made her less “mete” to rule than a 
male monarch, both God and English law legitimized her sovereign status. Therefore, 
as long as she followed the advice of her male counselors, her identity as monarch 
transcended her female gender. Knox would grant no such exceptions to the universal 
divine injunction against female rule. Secular law, which placed Elizabeth in line for 
the throne, could not supersede her natural inferiority as stipulated by God’s law. To 
Knox, Elizabeth was first and foremost defined by her womanhood.
Those citizens of London who constructed Elizabeth’s coronation entry
pageant veered closer to Knox’s position, defining the queen in unmistakably
feminine terms. In her analysis of the coronation text written by Richard Mulcaster,
entitled the Queen’s M ajesty’s Passage, Susan Frye emphasizes the gendered nature
of the dramatic allegories staged during the royal entry. During the course of the
coronation procession, Elizabeth was symbolically portrayed as a daughter, wife, and
1mother, dependent on her male citizens for guidance. In the fourth pageant of her 
entry, the English Bible is presented to Elizabeth, portrayed as Truth, the Daughter of 
Time. What may appear to be a straightforward affirmation of English Protestantism, 
argues Frye, is actually underpinned by expectations based on Elizabeth’s gender.
Two contrasting hills comprised the scenery of this pageant to symbolize the reigns of 
Mary and Elizabeth. The Marian hill was barren and stony, entitled “a decayed 
common weale,” where Elizabeth’s hill was beautiful and fertile, described as “a
157 Ibid., sig. M2v-M3r.
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florishing commonweale.” The figure who gives the Bible to the new queen is bom 
out o f a cave on Elizabeth’s productive hill. According to the Mulcaster’s coronation 
text, Elizabeth accepted the Bible as a mother would embrace her child, laying it upon 
her breast.159 The import of this analogy, asserts Frye, is that the queen’s embrace 
“formed a contract as permanent and natural as motherhood in her marriage to city 
interests.”160
Another pageant device suggested that her masculine citizens would accept 
Elizabeth as mother figure only conditionally. The ideal Elizabeth is depicted upon 
the Seate of Worthie Governance, accepting the virtues of Pure Religion, Love of 
Subjects, Wisdom, and Justice, while rejecting the vices of Rebellion, Insolence,
Folly, Vain Glory, and Bribery.161 If she strayed from this moral model, the creators 
o f the pageant warned, her exalted position as governmental head would be in 
jeopardy. As explained in the Passage, “the Queene’s majestie was established in the 
seate o f govemement: so she should syt fast in the same so long as she embraced
1 A ?  •  •vertue.” Significantly, no hereditary male king had ever been threatened with 
deposition if he displayed vain glory or insolence by refusing to be counseled. These 
two traits were thought to be quintessentially female failings. Because of her gender, 
Elizabeth would be held to a standard of behavior that befit her feminine body natural, 
not her princely body politic.
158 Susan Frye, Elizabeth I: The Competition for Representation (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 32. In contrast, Elizabeth’s male successor, James I, was depicted as a triumphant bridegroom 
vanquishing his receptive capital city.
159 Ibid., 44.
160 Ibid., 44, 45.
161 Ibid., 13.
162 Quoted in Frye, 13-14.
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In sixteenth-century England, gendered definitions of virtue created this 
double standard of monarchical behavior.163 For King Henry VIII, who sired several 
bastards during his reign, sexual conquests only augmented a virile reputation that 
was also officially measured by battlefield prowess. This was not the case for 
Elizabeth whose feminine virtue was associated with her chastity. According to Carol 
Levin and Norman Jones, Elizabeth’s chaste reputation was repeatedly challenged 
during her early reign. Elizabeth and her advisors attempted to quell rumors about 
alleged sexual interludes and illegitimate children with her acknowledged favorite, 
Robert Dudley.164 Prior to the Dudley predicament, Elizabeth had neutralized another 
potential sexual scandal that had beset her as a young woman living in the household 
o f Catherine Parr and Thomas Seymour.165 In this case, Elizabeth was the object of 
Seymour’s repeated sexual advances.
Though Elizabeth was able to defend her feminine honor, her mother, Anne 
Boleyn, had not been able to extricate herself from charges of sexual misconduct, 
resulting in her beheading. With Anne’s fate in mind, Elizabeth could not have failed 
to comprehend the dire threat posed by rumors of her defiled chastity or incestuous 
birth.166 This sexual gossip could damage much more than her reputation as a 
woman. As explained by Levin, “by being called unchaste, Elizabeth was also being 
charged with not being a good ruler in a way that was directly connected to her
163 Carol Levin, ‘The Heart and Stomach o f a King:’ Elizabeth I and the Politics of Sex and Power 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 76.
164 Jones, Elizabethan Age. 125-134.
165 For more information on the Seymour affair see Sheila Cavanagh, “The Bad Seed: Princess 
Elizabeth and the Seymour Incident,” in Pissing Elizabeth: Negative Representations of Gloriana, ed. 
Julia M. Walker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).
166 According to Boehrer, because of Anne’s alleged incest, rumors spread that Elizabeth was in fact 
the incestuous child of Anne and her brother George. See pp. 46-48.
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167sex.” For some of her subjects, Elizabeth’s sexual and monarchical reputations 
were one and the same; unlike her male counterparts, Elizabeth’s womanly failings 
could undermine her body politic, rendering her unfit to remain upon the Seate of 
Worthie Governance.
For Elizabeth’s councilors, marriage seemed the perfect solution to shore up 
their young, female monarch’s precarious reputation. According to de la Torre, the 
men of parliament and the privy council believed that marriage would end speculation 
over Elizabeth’s sexual conduct, contain and control her natural body, and provide the 
queen with much-needed male guidance.168 In Cecil’s words, “God send our mistress 
a husband, and by him a son, that we may hope our posterity shall have a masculine 
succession. This matter is too big for weak folks and too deep for simple.”169 
Elizabeth, however, “refused to assume the place of a married woman,... [recognizing 
that] she could not be fully queen and dutiful wife at once.”170 She instead opted for 
different means to deal with the gendered double standard that differentiated her reign 
from the reigns of her male predecessors.
One of the strategies she employed to transcend the alleged limitations of her 
gender was the theory of the queen’s two bodies. If this political fiction allowed her 
subjects to emphasize and denounce her feminine body, it also gave Elizabeth the 
ability to define herself as a powerful male. For example, though her coronation entry 
may have been specifically designed by the London citizenry to emphasize the 
queen’s feminine acquiescence, when Elizabeth was given the chance to speak, she
167 Levin, 76.
168 De la Torre, 151-2.
169 Quoted in Jones, Elizabethan Age. 132.
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described herself in masculine terms. In thanking God for preserving her life so that 
she may become queen, Elizabeth prayed, “I acknowledge that thou has dealt as 
wonderfully and mercifully with me, as thou didst with thy true and faithfull servant
* 171Daniel.” In this instance, it was Elizabeth who encoded her gendered message 
within a religious metaphor. In arguing for Elizabeth’s legitimacy to rule, Aylmer had 
also compared Elizabeth with biblical figures, but he had chosen the women Judith 
and Deborah, where as Elizabeth identified herself a male figure.
Elizabeth envisioned herself as a sovereign who happened to be a woman, 
actively constructing her own image in response to those passively feminine 
representations presented by others who wished to control her. She particularly 
emphasized the superiority of her male body politic when dealing with her MPs. In 
her response to a famous petition from parliament in 1563, Elizabeth directly 
addressed and refuted her MPs assumptions concerning her gender.172 She declared, 
“the weight and greatness of this matter might cause in me, being a woman wanting 
both wit and memory, some fear to speak, and bashfulness besides, a thing 
appropriate to my sex. But yet the princely seat and kingly throne wherein God hath
171constituted me,... boldeneth me to say somewhat in this matter.”
The matter of which she spoke was her marriage and the succession, issues 
that conflated Elizabeth’s natural and political bodies. By marrying and producing a
170 Jones, Elizabethan Age. 154.
171 Quoted in Frye, 36.
172 Elizabeth used the same tactic in February of 1559, reminding the men of parliament that “so 
constant have I allwayes contynued in this determynacion [to remain unwed], although my youth and 
woordes may seme to come hardlie to agree together....” See T. E. Hartley, Proceedings in the 
Parliaments of Elizabeth I vol. 1, 1558-1581 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1981), 45.
173 Ibid., 94.
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child of her natural body, Elizabeth would be simultaneously creating an heir for her 
body politic. Her MPs fully expected Elizabeth to carry out these dual duties of a 
woman and monarch. In their 1563 petition to the queen, the Lords advised that “God 
by the course of the scripture hath declared succession and having of children to be 
one of his principal benedictions in this life, and of the contrary he hath pronounced 
otherwise.” They then proceeded to remind Elizabeth of her biblical namesake, 
Elizabeth, the mother of John the Baptist, who “was joyfull when God had blessed her 
with fruit.”174 By using this example, her Lords insinuated that if Elizabeth remained 
voluntarily childless, she would be transgressing God’s divine law. As a woman, her 
duty to bear children had been decreed by God. This duty not even a monarch could
175circumvent.
Thus, despite her own clever use of the theory of the two bodies, Elizabeth 
could not escape the reality that at the beginning of her reign, everything “depended
1 * l f \on the deployment of her natural body.” Her unmarried status, the unsecured 
succession, and an ill-timed sickness drew attention to her young, frail, feminine body 
at the expense of the mature, masculine body politic Elizabeth wished to portray. To 
her male advisors, Elizabeth’s succession policies were the clearest examples of the 
inferiority of her female body. They believed that her womanly failings, namely her 
apparent inability to secure the succession, threatened the safety of her kingly body 
politic. By separating her two bodies in this manner, parliament was able to criticize
174 Ibid., Proceedings. 62.
175 Jones, Elizabethan Age. 135.
176 Frye, 24.
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the personal policies of their female queen while remaining steadfastly loyal to the 
monarchical state, which they had pledged to preserve.
4. Parliament and the Succession 
Elizabeth’s MPs and privy councilors expressed their advice and criticism 
through the rhetoric o f counsel. This counsel, as expressed by the political “creed” of 
Elizabeth’s principal secretary, William Cecil, limited the sovereignty of the monarch 
who was expected to abide by advice.177 This “marriage” of imperium and consilium, 
as Francis Bacon later termed it, had been made originally during Henry’s reign under
• • 17 ftthe direction of Thomas Cromwell. In Henry’s case, consilium was gendered 
female; parliament softened the impassioned judgments of Henry’s imperium with
• 170virtue and honesty. Intriguingly, because Elizabeth was a woman, the genders of 
imperium and consilium appear to have been reversed during her reign. No longer 
content in their role as passive advisors, Elizabeth’s male counselors took a much 
more assertive stance in directing their female monarch. As Aylmer had suggested, 
Elizabeth’s MPs should be always “at her elbow,” mitigating and strengthening her 
weaker female rule through reasoned guidance.
Elizabeth’s MPs acted on Aylmer’s advice, counselling Elizabeth that as the 
queen-in-parliament they should jointly settle the succession since “by reason of this 
parliament, whereby both such advice, consideration and consent as is requisite in so 
great and weighty a cause, may be better had and used now then at any other time
177 Alford, 3.
178 Guy, “Rhetoric of Counsel,” 292.
179 Guy, “Henrician Age,” 16.
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when no parliament is.”180 In response, Elizabeth herself employed the rhetoric of 
counsel. To their plea that she settle the succession, she replied, “I say that of the 
matter... I like and allow very well; as to the circumstances, if  any be, I mean upon 
further advice further to answer.”181 According to John Guy, Elizabeth “invoked this 
‘humanist-classical’ language to argue that she needed to be ‘advised’ on matters 
touching her Crown and the state, thereby turning recognition of the need for 
‘counsel’ into the excuse for rejecting parliament’s advice.”182
Elizabeth’s response to her MPs was, however, more than a clever twisting of 
words meant to buy herself time. Rather, Elizabeth and the men of parliament held 
fundamentally different understandings of the role counsel should play in the 
succession. For Elizabeth, the succession was a private issue, a matter of state 
subsumed under her arcana imperii; because her counselors considered the 
succession the cornerstone of the realm’s future security, they viewed it as a public 
issue that fell within their purview. Significantly, Elizabeth’s conception of her 
queenship was little different than her father’s sense of his imperium. Like Henry, 
Elizabeth held an exalted view of her own power, repeatedly emphasizing the 
independence of the head over its duty to abide by the counsel of the body. Both 
monarchs were dependent on parliament, but as a strong, kingly figure, Henry had 
been able to keep his feminine counsel at bay. Though she attempted to identify 
herself with her male body politic, declaring that “I be a woman yet I have as good 
courage answerable to my place as ever my father had,” in reality, the female
180 Hartley, Proceedings, 59.
181 Ibid., 95.
182 Guy, “Rhetoric of Counsel,” 303.
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Elizabeth was unable to control her male councilors in the same manner as her 
1father. Her gender prompted parliament to appropriate a greater part in the 
succession, a role which they could not assume under the masculine Henry. Thus, as 
a woman, Elizabeth had to deal with the contradiction in Tudor monarchy that her 
father had created yet avoided: imperial kingship was dependent on parliamentary 
counsel.
This Henrician paradox, Elizabeth’s gender, and parliament’s duty to counsel 
in the face of Elizabeth’s refusal to listen, led to parliament’s escalating interference 
in the royal succession, an interference that altered the relationship between 
parliament and Crown under the Tudors. It is important to clarify that by the word 
escalating, I do not mean “rising” in the sense that Neale used the term. There is no 
evidence that MPs’ actions during Elizabeth’s reign were part of a long-term strategy 
to modify England’s form of government by investing sovereignty in parliament. By 
escalating, I mean instead that MPs took increasingly desperate and radical measures 
to fulfill their duty to counsel the queen and preserve the English state.
In 1559, parliament’s counsel took the form of a petition to their queen 
requesting that she fulfill her duty as a woman and marry. Avoiding their former faux  
pas under Mary, they urged Elizabeth to marry whomever she pleased at her earliest 
convenience. Elizabeth graciously offered to consider their petition, although stating 
her personal preference to remain single. Significantly, she also commended their 
decision not to limit her choices, stating, “if  it had been otherwise, I must needs have 
misliked it very much and thought it in you a very great presumption, being unfiting
183 Guy, “Tudor Monarchy,” 98.
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and altogether unmete for you to require them that may command.”185 In this 
exchange, Elizabeth’s desire to restrict parliament’s role in the succession is already 
apparent, as is parliament’s assertive counterclaim to be a deciding force in this 
preeminent issue.
When parliament reconvened in 1563, Elizabeth had yet to take a husband.
Her single status prompted MPs to draft another petition counselling her to marry, to 
which they also added a request that the queen-in-parliament determine a successor 
who would assume the throne should the queen die childless. For her part, Elizabeth 
had made clear her desire to leave the succession unsettled during her lifetime. As 
Elizabeth put it, she “had no desire to be buried alive”186 as her sister had been when 
protestant detractors flocked to the princess Elizabeth. To preserve her own 
uncontested sovereignty and also to hold at bay the Catholic threat posed by her 
Scottish cousin, Mary Stuart, Elizabeth believed it in the best interests of the English 
nation to forgo the naming of a successor. Her MPs thought otherwise; the tone of 
their 1563 petition reflects a growing frustration with what they considered 
Elizabeth’s imprudent policies.
Reaching beyond the traditional format of humble requests for the queen to 
consider, the 1563 petition chastised Elizabeth by comparing her unfavorably to her 
presumably wiser kingly predecessors. The petitioner declared, “all your Majestie’s 
progenitors, kinges of the realme, hath in this behalf ben so carefull that from the 
Conquest to this present daye the realme was never left, as now it is, without a certein
184 Hartley, Proceedings. 148.
185 Ibid., 45.
186 Quoted in de la Torre, 387.
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heire living and knowen to whome the crowne after the death of the prince shuld
* 187appertein.” In addition, the petitioner reminded Elizabeth how her grandfather, 
Henry VII, had ended civil war and secured the Tudor line through marriage and the
# 1 QO
production of heirs of his body. By drawing these explicit comparisons, the 
members of parliament hoped to convince Elizabeth to see what seemed to them the 
obvious truth: England was in peril as long as the queen remained unwed and the 
succession otherwise unsecured.
Elizabeth’s MPs did not stop at demonstrating the need for a named successor. 
They also presumed to instruct Elizabeth on the right and wrong choices. Though 
Elizabeth had displayed ostensible favoritism toward Mary Stuart, her MPs warned 
against embracing a non-English candidate. They noted that “we have ben 
admonished of the great mallice of your forein enemies, which even in your life time 
have sought to transferre the right and dignity o f your crowne to a stranger.”189 The 
better candidate, her councilors suggested, was Lady Catherine Grey, the one already 
selected by Elizabeth’s “most noble father” with his “most princely and fatherly 
zeale,” a zeal that Elizabeth had yet to demonstrate. Parliament’s explicit, almost 
condescending advice to Elizabeth to follow her father’s dictates was a far cry from 
the license they gave to Henry in allowing him to settle the succession in his last will 
and testament.
As argued by de la Torre, the difference in this treatment stemmed from 
Elizabeth’s gender. Parliament felt that as a woman, and one who seemed incapable
187 Hartley, Proceedings. 92.
188 Ibid., 91.
64
of understanding what was best for the nation, Elizabeth required extensive counsel to
reverse her inferior approach to the succession and adopt the superior policy
embraced by her male progenitors and male councilors. According to de la Torre, “in
spelling out the dangers to Elizabeth of remaining unwed and childless, of favoring
her Stuart cousin, and ultimately, by explaining the course she should follow, MPs
were mitigating female monarchy in the uniquely English way Aylmer had envisioned
in his treatise.”190 Elizabeth’s response to her MPs’ petition is one that we have
already discussed. To defend against the obvious gender prejudices of her councilors,
she described herself as possessing two bodies, the stronger of which was masculine
and, as such, unaffected by feminine inferiority. She then tabled the matter of the
succession by appealing for “further advice.”191
One of Elizabeth’s MPs took seriously her call for additional counsel. During
the 1563 parliamentary session, John Hales wrote and distributed a treatise entitled A
Declaration o f  the Succession o f  the Crowne Imperiall o f  England in which he sought
to advise both the queen and his fellow parliamentarians on the legal suitability of the 
• 100rival claimants for the succession. He began his tract by explicitly refuting 
Elizabeth’s wish to categorize the succession as a private matter of state, declaring 
that this important issue “concemeth the whole realme universally, and every one of
1 Q Ouse particularly.” His tract was ultimately responsible for initiating a succession
190 De la Torre, 238-9.
191 Hartley, Proceedings. 94-95.
192 This was not the first time Hales took it upon himself to guide the queen. In 1559, he had addressed 
an “Oration” to Elizabeth on her coronation, explicating many of the same themes as Aylmer, including 
Elizabeth’s exceptionalism, which in 1566, he had come to doubt. Hoak, “A Tudor Deborah?”, 5.
193 John Hales, “A Declaration of the Succession of the Crowne Imperiall of England, 1563,” in The 
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pamphlet war that raged between 1563 and 1566, in which English politicians very 
publicly debated what the queen had wished to treat privately. No king had ever been 
subject to such a torrent of advice and often hostile criticism on the matter of his
194succession.
But, as Hales asserted, no king had ever handled the issue of the succession so 
inadequately. Like the parliamentary petition of the same year, Hales implied that 
Elizabeth was not living up to the reputations of her male progenitors. Of her father, 
Hales wrote, “King Henry so long time before (like a prudent Prince) forsaw the great 
daunger, that the realme might fall in, for the uncertaynty of the succession; and that 
he had procured authority and power by parlayment to establish it... like a father of his 
county, with good advisement and deliberation he made his will, and established the 
succession.”195 While ostensibly praising Henry, this statement censured Elizabeth in 
comparison. If her father was a “prudent prince” who listened to the “advisement” of 
his parliament and “forsaw the daunger” of an unsettled succession, Elizabeth was 
imprudent for not heeding her MP’s counsel to designate an heir during her lifetime.
Hales then proceeded to offer his opinion on whom Elizabeth should name. 
Like the 1563 petition, he favored Catherine Grey and opposed Mary Stuart, but his 
bold use of legal arguments provided more than advice to the queen. They effectively 
eliminated her choice in the matter. To Hales, the law allowed only a single claimant, 
Catherine Grey, the one stipulated in parliamentary statute by Henry VIITs will; he 
stated in no uncertain terms that Mary Queen of Scots was ineligible for the English 
throne because of her foreign status. He declared, “the Scottish Quene is not the
194 De la Torre, 319.
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kinge of England’s child nor was borne in the kinge of England’s alleigaunce; nor yet 
come of father and mother in the faithe and alleigaunce of the king of England, nor is 
a free-woman in England: wherefore by the lawes of England, she can not inherit in 
the realme.”196 Though an imperial monarch, Hales thus implied that Elizabeth was 
powerless to alter the succession because it had already been decided by law.
As if using the law to suspend her will were not enough of an affront to 
Elizabeth’s sovereignty, Hales procured foreign legal advice, to the effect that 
Catherine Grey’s marriage to the earl of Hertford had indeed been legitimate. This 
finding contradicted the ruling of Elizabeth’s ecclesiastical court and rendered 
Catherine’s sons potential male heirs to the English throne. Though he reiterated 
many of the same arguments as the 1563 parliamentary petition, Hales had progressed 
from advising to dictating to the queen on the issue of the succession. His legal 
conclusions indicated that both the queen’s alleged preference for Mary Stuart and the 
judgments of her courts were legally untenable.
Hales’ recourse to the law to limit Elizabeth’s sovereignty echoes Aylmer’s 
claim that a female monarch was no threat to England because the law, not the 
monarch ruled. Also like Aylmer, Hales considered female rulers less mete to make 
wise decisions than their male counterparts. In his treatise, he baldly contended, 
“because God first made man, and of man woman; and hath also made him a more 
apter instrument to serve in the common weale, in the functions both of body and 
mind; therefore is man preferred before the woman, and thought the more worthy
195 Hales, xxviii.
196 Ibid., xxxi.
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person, not only by the lawes of nature, but also by the lawes of this realm.”197 
Though his reasoning sounds distinctly like Knox’s denunciation of woman rulers, 
Hales recognized the legitimacy of Elizabeth’s monarchy, and, like Aylmer, looked to 
the law and the all-male counsel of parliament to mitigate her queenship.
Hales began his tract with a description of the members of parliament as the 
“few chosen of an infinite multitude to treat and do these things, that shall be for the
10Rbenefit of the commonweale, and be put in trust for the body of the realme.” 
According to de la Torre, Hales’ statement, resonating with the language of conciliar 
duty, demonstrates that he “believed parliament the rightful body to exercise the 
governing power for the good of the people.”199 Hales implied that if Elizabeth chose 
Mary over Catherine, the only legal claimant by his logic, she would be committing 
tyranny, and the power of governance would devolve to parliament as the 
representatives of the people. He uttered this threat in the form of the Latin phrase, 
“Propter iniusticias et iniurias, transferretur regnum a gente in gentem.”200 In other 
words, Hales believed that it was the duty of parliament to act, with or without the 
queen, in the best interests of the nation, and to settle the succession on Catherine 
who “we be bound by our Oaths and our laws to take.”201
In Hales’ vision of the succession settlement, Elizabeth’s personal policies 
were superseded by her MP’s duties to preserve the English. As de la Torre remarks,
197 Ibid., xxxiv.
198 Ibid., xx.
199 De la Torre, 317.
200 Hales, xlii.
201 Ibid., xli.
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these are “bold words from a mere MP and clerk”202 that contain a radical conception 
of parliament’s counciliar role in the English monarchical state. In his tract, Hales 
attempted to limit the queen’s sovereignty by narrowing her choices, encouraging 
parliament to act on the succession if the queen would not do so, and establishing 
parliament as the alternate seat of sovereignty if the queen made what he considered 
the wrong choice on the succession. Elizabeth was so offended by his temerity that 
Hales spent a year in the Tower and remained under house arrest for the rest of his 
life.203
During the very same year in which Hales published his tract and parliament 
presented its petition, another more significant councilor was devising a strategy to 
solve the Elizabethan succession crisis by parliamentary means. Where Hales 
suggested that parliament should settle the succession without the queen but provided 
no tangible plan by which they could do so, William Cecil drafted a pragmatic bill 
that would establish a parliamentary interregnum in the event of Elizabeth’s demise 
without heir. Long thought to be a loyal supporter of Elizabeth’s personal policies, 
Cecil was in fact a conciliarist whose duties to preserve the state surpassed his 
obligation to serve his queen, as John Guy and Stephen Alford have recently 
argued.204 As Elizabeth’s closest advisor, he understood, perhaps better than anyone, 
how difficult it would be to force Elizabeth’s hand on the succession. With this 
present impasse in mind, he sought to ensure the stability of the realm after
202 De la Torre, 317.
203 S. T. Bindoff, ed. The House of Commons: 1509-1558 vol. II (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1982), 
276-277. Hales also had spent a year in the Tower when he was caught up in the fall of Protector 
Somerset at the beginning of Mary’s reign.
204 See “Introduction” of Alford’s book.
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Elizabeth’s death. Cecil’s interregnum council would rule England in Elizabeth’s 
stead until parliament could determine the appropriate heir. Through this solution, 
Cecil hoped to prevent a lapse in royal authority which historically had led to civil 
strife and a struggle for the throne.
Though this draft bill was never introduced in parliament, it provides a 
window into Cecil’s conception of the relationship between queen and parliament at 
this crucial moment in Elizabeth’s reign. The radical logic underpinning the bill 
suggested that parliament had the authority to separate imperial power from the 
person of the queen through statute. Rather than inhering to any particular candidate 
upon Elizabeth’s death, Cecil’s clause proposed that her imperial body would reside 
in a council of state until such time as parliament determined the next monarch. In 
effect, Cecil contended that through statute, parliament could divide the queen’s two 
bodies.
As Guy asserts, this type of argument could be viable only in reference to a 
female monarch, for reasons we have already discussed.205 Elizabeth’s seeming 
incapacity to understand the danger o f an unsettled succession had highlighted the 
disparity between her womanly and monarchical bodies, allowing her councilors to 
conclude “there was something more permanent than the life of the physical body of 
the queen.”206 As explained by Alford, “it was an admission that public or national 
good could sometimes be defined in isolation from - even in direct opposition to - the 
will of an individual monarch.”207 Fueled by the rhetoric of counsel and Elizabeth’s
205 Guy, “Tudor Monarchy and its Critiques,” 97.
206 Alford, 42.
207 Ibid., 117.
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supposedly inferior gender, both Hales and Cecil envisioned a greatly enhanced, 
independent role for parliament in English government, not as a permanent republican 
substitute for monarchy, but as a solution to the succession crisis.
In the years between 1563 and 1566, and at parliament in 1566, other self- 
styled male counselors reiterated many of Hales’ and Cecil’s arguments in their 
attempts to guide the wayward Elizabeth and galvanize parliament into establishing 
the succession with or without the queen’s consent. In the tract entitled the Common 
Cry o f  Englishman made to the most Noble Lady, Queen Elizabeth and the High 
Court o f  Parliament, Richard Sampson delineated his vision of the queen’s 
inadequacies. According to Sampson, a radical Marian exile, Elizabeth was 
untrustworthy, fickle, and timorous, negative characteristics commonly associated 
with all women. She had failed to keep her 1563 promise that she would marry, was 
seemingly unable to make a firm commitment to any one suitor, and thus far had been 
too afraid to settle the great matter of the succession. In sum, her natural, female 
body had “gone astray.” Because Elizabeth had proven herself unable to act in the 
best interests of England, Sampson, like Hales and Aylmer before him, turned to the 
men of parliament to assuage her ineptitude. If monarchs should go astray, he 
asserted, “then do not only wise councilors stand instead, but chiefly such great 
assemblies of such persons so authorized and therewith privileged as parliament men 
are.” By suggesting parliament as an alternative authority to the wayward 
Elizabeth, Sampson explicitly stated what Hales had implied. Not only could the
208 Sampson in Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 181.
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queen not rule without her parliament, but “oftentimes [she should] be ruled by 
them....”209
Reacting to the mounting body of writing that encouraged them to take 
independent initiative on the succession, the Lords and Commons, comprising the 
parliament of 1566, agreed to take the unprecedented step of introducing legislation 
on the succession without the queen’s blessing. The speech that suggested this course 
of action contains familiar arguments asserting the public, not private, implications of 
the succession, the peril o f the realm without a known successor, Elizabeth’s inability 
to grasp political realities, and the duty of parliament to counsel or, if need be, coerce 
the queen to establish the succession with all due speed. In a none-too-flattering 
biblical metaphor, the petitioner suggested that the men of parliament could no longer 
claim that they had been seduced by Elizabeth, as Adam had by Eve, into endangering 
the security of the English nation. In the speaker’s words, “If we do protract it and 
feigne this or that excuse, it will help us noe more then when Evah, when she had 
eaten of the forbidden fruite, to say the serpent had deceived her, or as Adam sayd, 
‘the woman whome thou gavest me gave it unto me.”210 If they did not settle the 
succession at this juncture, the petitioner implied, they would be no better than 
Eve/Elizabeth, traitors to their duty to preserve the realm.
Eve was one of the female biblical figures to whom Elizabeth had been 
compared. The first figure, Deborah, had been employed by Aylmer to suggest that 
Elizabeth was an exceptional female ruler just as Deborah had been one of few 
women to hold positions of leadership in the Bible. Through this comparison, he
209 Sampson in Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 182.
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granted Elizabeth a certain amount o f agency to reign over the English nation so long 
as she abided by the law and the advice of her counselors.211 As one pageant at her 
coronation warned, however, this agency would be guaranteed only as long as she 
continued to display her exceptional status. In 1563, Elizabeth’s failure to marry and 
bear children tarnished her image as an exception to the rule, prompting parliament to 
compare her to the more admirable Elizabeth of the Bible who had passively and 
joyfully accepted her duties as wife and mother. Thus, between 1559 and 1563, 
Elizabeth’s subordinate womanhood had come more strongly to the fore, 
overshadowing her identity as an independent, imperial ruler. By 1566, Elizabeth was 
once again metaphorically portrayed as possessing agency, but this agency was 
decidedly negative and inextricably connected to her allegedly weaker gender. One 
member of parliament implied that as the temptress Eve, Elizabeth had failed to 
protect her nation’s interests, manipulating her male councilors into abiding by her 
imprudent succession policies.
Though her MPs had emphasized the weaknesses of her natural body as a 
descendant of Eve, Elizabeth responded to her MP’s 1566 petition through allusion to 
her male body politic. She compared herself to her noble father, declaring “thowghe I 
be a woman yet I have as good a corage answerable to mye place as ever my fathere
o 1 'yhade. I wyll never be by vyolence constreyned to doo anye thynge.” She then 
lambasted the feet o f the body politic, parliament, for attempting to direct the head, 
their monarch, thereby attempting to realign the relationship between Crown and
210 Hartley, Proceedings. 136.
211 Hoak, “A Tudor Deborah?”, 3.
212 Hartley, Proceedings. 148.
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parliament that was becoming dangerously close to a competition for control between 
equals. These words were part of an address that Elizabeth delivered to a joint 
council o f Lords and Commons, preemting their draft of the impending succession 
bill. Through this speech, she deftly neutralizing the threat of parliament’s 
independent action, declaring that she would not be “by vyolence constreyned to doo 
anye thinge.”
By 1571, however, Elizabeth finally conceded that the settlement of the 
succession was a matter to be decided by the queen-in-parliament. As stated in the 
Treasons Act o f that year, anyone who denied that, “the lady Elizabeth, with and by 
the authority o f the Parliament of England, is able to make laws and statutes of 
sufficient force and validity to limit and bind the crown of this realm” would be guilty 
of high treason.213 According to Mortimer Levine, this act indicated that “at long last 
and no matter how reluctantly, Henry VIII’s precedents had been accepted by his 
younger daughter.”214 In some ways, Levine’s assessment is true. Elizabeth had 
admitted that parliament should play a legislative role in the succession as they had 
during Henry’s reign. It was, however, Henry’s will to settle his succession in 
parliament where Elizabeth preferred to treat the succession as a private matter of her 
arcana imperii. From this perspective, the relationship between Elizabeth and her 
parliaments had moved well beyond Henry’s precedent. Henry’s parliaments 
consented to his inconsistent succession acts, passively accepted his numerous wives, 
and even bestowed Henry with the authority to alter the succession through his last 
will and testament. Elizabeth was granted none of these privileges. Parliament
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consistently contested her preference to remain single and childless and actively 
thwarted her desire to leave the succession unsettled. Turning to the all-male 
parliament to mitigate Elizabeth’s queenship, men such as John Aylmer, John Hales, 
Richard Sampson, and William Cecil respectively suggested that parliament should 
limit Elizabeth’s sovereignty, initiate succession legislation on their own accord, 
settle the succession without the queen, and by statute, transfer power to a council of 
state in the even of Elizabeth’s demise without heir.
Under a female monarch, the male members of parliament were no longer 
silent partners in the process of government, but an active, masculine force ready to 
challenge their female monarch’s policies if they were believed to threaten the 
preservation of the realm. Though Henry had been responsible for including 
parliament in deciding the royal succession, Elizabeth’s gender and her apparently 
inferior policies on the succession brought the Henrician contradiction to a head. 
During the early part of Elizabeth’s reign, political conflict raged between Crown and 
parliament in which parliament’s assertive consilium diminished Tudor imperium.
213 Elizabeth I’s Second Treasons Act in Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 183.
214 Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 120.
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